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According to research applying a social constructionist perspective, the sense of 
self is not lost in people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). It is, however, greatly 
influenced by the symptoms and by how they are treated by other people. 
Without support, it is difficult to preserve a positive sense of self, when living 
with progressing cognitive impairments. The stigma associated with cognitive 
impairment also threatens their sense of self. Harré’s social constructionist 
theories of self and positioning have been used to study how people with AD 
express their sense of self. As there is a need to expand the previous research by 
involving additional participants and research contexts, the aim of the present 
thesis was to describe, in accordance with Harré’s theories of self and 
positioning, how people with AD expressed their sense of self in personal 
interviews and in support groups with other people with AD. The research 
consists of four substudies (I–IV), and has a qualitative, descriptive, and theory-
testing approach. Thirteen people with mild and moderate AD were included, 11 
of whom had the early onset form of the disease. Two support groups were 
formed, led by facilitators who supported the communication and the 
participants’ expressions of self. Each group met 10 times during an eight-month 
period. Topics were not predetermined, and introduced by both facilitators and 
participants. Semistructured interviews were conducted before the groups started 
and after they ended. The interviews and support group conversations were 
audio-recoded and analysed with qualitative content analysis, guided by Harré’s 
theories. In substudy I, the initial interviews were deductively analysed. The 
findings showed that Self 1 (the sense of being a singular, embodied person) was 
expressed by the participants without difficulties. Self 2 (the perception of one’s 
personal attributes and life history) was expressed as feeling mainly the same 
person. While some abilities had been lost, other had been developed. Self 3 (the 
socially constructed self) was described as mostly supported, but sometimes 
threatened in interactions with other people (I). In substudy II, support group 
conversations were analysed abductively with respect to expressions of Self 2. It 
was found that participants expressed Self 2 in terms of agency and communion, 
and a lack of agency and communion (II). In substudy III, a secondary analysis 
 ii 
of the data from substudy II was performed inductively with the aim of 
describing how Self 3 was constructed in the interaction of the support group. 
Five first-order positions, generating lively interaction, were described: the 
project manager, the storyteller, the moral agent, the person burdened with AD, 
and the coping person (III). In substudy IV, all the collected data were 
reanalysed inductively, focusing on how participants expressed the experience of 
being research participants. Three themes were constructed: contributing to an 
important cause, gaining from participating, and experiencing risks and 
drawbacks (IV). In conclusion, it was found that participants constructed positive 
social selves through the support from each other, the facilitator, and researchers 
in the support group (III), and as research participants (IV). Agency and 
communion were central to Self 2, and decreased with the progression of AD 
(II). In spite of change, participants perceived themselves as basically the same 
people, with a potential to learn and develop as persons (I). 
 
Keywords: agency, Alzheimer’s disease, communion, early onset, Harré’s social 
constructionist theory, positioning, research participation, self, support group 
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PREFACE  
I would like to say that I have always been passionately engaged with people 
with Alzheimer’s disease. This is, however, not the case. As a registered nurse 
working in geriatric and residential care, I was often uncomfortable when caring 
for people with dementia disease. Although I found them interesting, I also 
found them unpredictable and difficult to understand and work with. My training 
as a nurse included little about cognitive impairment. On the geriatric wards in 
which I worked in the beginning of the 1990s, the environment and staff routines 
were not organized to support the care of people with dementia disease. The long 
corridors and rushed staff likely increased their confusion. As most doors were 
unlocked, the patients with dementia disease sometimes wandered around, 
disturbing the other patients. They were sometimes anxious and difficult to calm 
down. In the residential home where I later worked, the corridors were shorter 
and the environment better suited for people with dementia disease. As a 
registered nurse, however, I was less involved in the daily care, and often called 
for when troubles arose, for example, when residents with dementia disease 
became agitated. Again, they were often difficult to calm down, which left me 
with a feeling of inadequacy. However, in these years, I also started to learn 
more from colleagues who had a special interest in people with dementia disease 
and shared their knowledge with me. In retrospect, I can see that progress in 
research on how to understand and support people with dementia disease had an 
impact on us working ‘on the floor’ and made possible improvements in care. 
Although much still needs to be done, research has contributed to a better life for 
people with Alzheimer’s and other dementia diseases. As a nurse and a nurse 
educator, I have found that patients are often the best teachers. From listening to 
the ones we are working with, we can learn a lot about how to best support them. 
With this background, I was happy to have the opportunity to engage in the 
present research. It is my hope that it will contribute to improving the views and 
care of people with Alzheimer’s and other dementia diseases, as previous 
research in this area has. Although the participants of the present research were 
in the early and moderate stages of cognitive impairment and did not receive 
residential care, they can teach us much about both their present and future 
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needs. They can also teach us that people with dementia disease are ‘still there’ 
and not ‘gone’, as they are sometimes said to be. Further, they teach us how we, 
who do not (yet) have cognitive impairments, can assist them in preserving a 
positive sense of self. 
  1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The risk of having Alzheimer’s disease (AD) increase with age, and the 
condition also occasionally occurs before the age of 65. It is dreaded by many, 
not only because it leads to severe cognitive and functional impairments, but also 
because it is often said to erode the sense of self. In the present research project, 
13 people with AD have been followed for a period of ten months, to see how 
they express their sense of self in interviews and in support groups intended to 
promote a sense of self. Harré’s (1998) theory of self has been used to analyse 
the data. To understand the impact of AD on the sense of self, it is vital to have 
some knowledge about the disease, what it is like to live with it, and how it 
affects one’s daily life. Before further describing the study and its theoretical 
basis, I will thus start out by accounting for some biomedical facts about AD, the 
subjective experience of living with AD, and the care and support of people 
living with AD and their family members. Although the focus of this thesis is on 
the sense of self, the introduction is intended to illuminate the difficulties that 
people with AD encounter, and the kind of support they need to be able to 
manage daily life and experience well-being. Further in the introduction, I will 
account for previous research on how people with AD express their sense of self 
and for the theoretical frameworks used in this research.  
1.1 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common type (about 60 %) of dementia diseases 
(DD; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2007). In Sweden, 
148,000 people are estimated to live with DD (National Board of Health and 
Welfare, 2010). Eight per cent of people aged 65 and over, and almost 50% of 
people aged 90 and over have DD (National Board of Health and Welfare, 
2010). The typical features of AD, a loss of neurons and a presence of amyloid 
plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, were first discovered by the German 
physician Alois Alzheimer in the brain tissue of a diseased 55-year-old woman 
(Cipriani, Dolciotti, Picchi, & Bonuccelli, 2011). It was thus considered to be a 
rare type of DD striking people under the age of 65, and not until the 1970s was 
it realized that ‘senile dementia’ in older people was often the same disease 
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(Cipriani et al., 2011). Though there has been substantial progress in recent years 
concerning the pathogenesis of AD, it is still not fully known what causes the 
condition (Ballard et al., 2011). Age, heredity, previous head traumas, medical 
conditions such as hypertension and diabetes, and lifestyle factors such as 
smoking and alcohol intake contribute to the prevalence of AD, while a high 
education level and physical and mental activity are mediating factors (Ballard et 
al., 2011). 
1.2 SYMPTOMS OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
Alzheimer’s disease is characterized by cognitive and functional impairments, 
often combined with behavioural and psychiatric symptoms (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2007). The disease is generally 
described as progressing from a mild stage in which people are able to manage 
activities of daily living independently, to a moderate stage where they need 
some help, and a severe stage in which they are dependent on others in most 
activities (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). At the onset, the 
symptoms are diffuse and slowly increasing (Alzheimer’s Association, 2012). 
Memory loss is the most common early sign, especially the retrieval of recent 
memories (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2007). 
Additionally, there is a range of other early signs, which in the beginning are 
easily confused with other medical conditions and with normal ageing. Such 
early signs are, for example, difficulties in planning and completing familiar 
tasks, confusion of time and place, social withdrawal, and mood change 
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2012). 
 The cognitive symptoms can be described as four A’s, namely amnesia 
(impaired memory), apraxia (impaired ability to carry out volitional 
movements), agnosia (impaired perception), and aphasia (impaired language 
ability) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Amnesia typically first affects 
the short-term memory. Later, the long-term memory is also affected. 
Recognition is better preserved than recall, implying that people with AD might 
remember when reminded (Sabat, 2001, p. 46). The implicit memory is better 
preserved than the explicit, meaning that people can have an unconscious 
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memory of things that cannot be recalled consciously (Sabat, 2006). Apraxia can 
cause difficulties with taking part in activities and performing everyday tasks 
like writing, dressing, grooming, eating, and walking (Dassel, 2009; Della Salla, 
Spinnler, & Venneri, 2004). Agnosia makes it difficult to recognize, for 
example, objects, odours, shapes, sounds, and people (Leifner, 2009). This 
hampers, for example, the abilities to read and deal with money (Dassel, 2009). 
 Aphasia is of special significance to this thesis, as the data consist of 
dialogue. Aphasia as a symptom of AD should not be confused with primary 
progressive aphasia, which is more common in frontotemporal dementia 
(Kirshner, 2012). People with AD exhibit difficulties with both speaking and 
comprehending speech (Bayles, 2003). They forget words, which forces them to 
use circumlocutions and paraphrases. They also forget what they were about to 
say and hear in the middle of conversations (follow threads), which makes them 
dependent on their interlocutors reminding them and getting them ‘back on 
track’ (Sabat, 2001). This becomes especially difficult when many people are 
involved in a conversation, and also when conversations take place in noisy or 
busy environments. Further, people with DD need prolonged time to understand 
the meaning of what has been said, and to formulate answers.  
 Alzheimer’s disease is also characterized by impaired executive 
functions, that is, planning, organizing, and abstract thinking (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), and neuropsychiatric symptoms (Karttunen et al., 
2011), sometimes referred to as BPSD (behavioural and psychological 
symptoms in dementia) (e.g. Keady & Jones, 2010). The most prevalent 
neuropsychiatric symptoms are apathy, depression, irritability, and agitation. 
Also occurring are for example, delusions, hallucinations, and sleeping disorders 
(Karttunen et al., 2011). Researchers found no association between 
neuropsychiatric symptoms and neuropathology in people with AD (García-
Alberca et al., 2013; Staekenborg et al., 2008), and suggested that 
neuropsychiatric symptoms, at least partly, might be due to psychosocial and 
genetic factors (Staekenborg et al., 2008).  
 4 
 There is currently no cure for AD. Within approximately four to eight 
years, it leads to death, but the individual differences are large, and some people 
live up to 20 years after being diagnosed (Alzheimer’s Association, 2012). In a 
study of autopsy reports (Brunnström & Englund, 2009), researchers found that 
55.5% of the people with AD died from respiratory disease, particularly 
bronchopneumonia, compared to 7.4% in the general population of people aged 
65 and more. This was assumed to reflect the eating and mobility difficulties in 
people with severe AD (Brunnström & Englund, 2009). 
1.3 EARLY ONSET OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
Although the neuropathology is similar, based on clinical differences a 
distinction is made between AD with early and late onset (Licht, McMurtray, 
Saul, & Mendez, 2007; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2007). 
Early onset (also termed younger onset) is defined as debut of symptoms before 
the age of 65 (World Health Organisation, 2010). Fewer than 5% of people with 
AD have early onset, which, although rare, might occur from the age of 30 
(National Institute of Aging, 2011). Alzheimer’s disease with early onset is often 
familial, unlike the late onset form (National Institute of Aging, 2011). It is also 
more aggressive and progresses more rapidly. It is more common that the early 
debut occurs without amnesia, other symptoms such as aphasia, agnosia, and 
apraxia being predominant. Impaired executive functions are less common in 
people with early as compared to late onset (Mendez, Lee, Joshi, & Shapira, 
2012), as are also the appearance of neuropsychiatric symptoms at the debut of 
the disease (Toyota et al., 2007). 
People with early onset of AD differ from those with late onset not only 
in symptoms and course of the disease, but also in their social situations. The 
society might also be less prepared to acknowledge and support them. Because 
the condition is rare in younger people and presents atypically, people with early 
onset often report difficulties in being correctly diagnosed (Roach, Keady, Bee, 
& Hope, 2008). While still in their working years, as a result of the disease, 
people with early onset are commonly forced to give up work in advance of 
normal retirement. Additionally, they might be living with children or teenagers 
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who are dependent on them (Roach et al., 2008). Care services are often not 
tailored to fit their special needs (Roach et al., 2008). People with early onset 
emphasized financial difficulties and a need for information more than those 
with late onset (Batsch & Miller, 2009). Having AD in a phase of life when 
people are expected to be independent and active is likely to impose more strain 
on the sense of self and to be associated with greater experienced stigma, than 
having it in a phase when functional decline is more common (Harris & Keady, 
2009; Tolhurst, Bhattacharyya, & Kingston, 2014).  
1.4 MEDICAL CARE OF PEOPLE WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
The basic medical examination proposed for people with cognitive symptoms of 
unknown origin aims at ruling out possible causes other than DD, and 
determining the type of DD and degree of functional impairment (National 
Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). It is recommended that evaluation include 
interviews with the person and someone who knows the person well, about the 
origin and character of the symptoms; assessment of the physical, mental, and 
cognitive states (MMSE and clock test); and functional and activity capacity 
(National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). Further, a CT or MRI scan are 
suggested to rule out conditions that might be confused with or contribute to the 
symptoms, such as tumours and haematomas, and to discriminate AD from other 
types of DD (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). Additionally, blood 
samples to rule out other conditions, such as disturbed thyroid function, are 
recommended (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). If the diagnosis 
cannot be determined by the basic examination, additional cognitive tests, MRI, 
SPECT, and analysis of biomarkers and infection parameters in spinal fluid 
might be undertaken (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010).  
Although there is no cure, drugs that alleviate the cognitive symptoms of 
AD have been developed (Ballard et al., 2011). According to the Swedish 
guidelines for care of people with DD (National Board of Health and Welfare, 
2010) cholinesterase inhibitors (donezepil, galantamine, and revastigmine) 
should be offered to people with mild to moderate AD, and memantine to people 
with moderate to severe AD (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). The 
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effects of cholinesterase inhibitors on cognitive function, mood, and social 
interaction are described as moderate (Ballard et al., 2011). Memantine has been 
reported to improve cognition and function, and possibly decrease aggression 
and agitation (Ballard et al., 2011). On the downside of medication, neither 
cholinesterase inhibitors nor memantine alleviate the cognitive symptoms in all 
people with AD, and cholinesterase inhibitors have side effects in the form of 
nausea and diarrhoea affecting 10–15% of the people treated (National Board of 
Health and Welfare, 2010).  
1.5 LIVING AND COPING WITH COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT 
The subjective experience of living with AD and other types of DD was long 
neglected in research, as researchers considered it methodologically and ethically 
problematic to have informants with cognitive impairments (Hellström, Nolan, 
Nordenfelt, & Lundh, 2007). In recent decades, however, it has been 
increasingly realized that many people with DD are able to provide informed 
consent to participate in research and to account reliably for their experiences 
when appropriate research methods are applied (Hellström et al., 2007; Nygård, 
2006). Studies in this field often include people with various dementia diagnoses 
(de Boer et al., 2007) and also sometimes people who have not yet received a 
diagnosis (e.g. Robinson, Ekman, Meleis, Winblad, & Wahlund, 1997). In this 
section I will thus mainly use the term ‘dementia’, referring to the common 
symptoms of DD, unless the studies referred to have specifically focused on 
people with AD. Research on living with dementia often includes the 
perspectives of both the people with dementia and their closest family members. 
When the voice of the person with dementia has been possible to discern, I have 
chosen to include such studies in the following review. If nothing else is 
specifically stated, it is the views of the people with the symptoms that I account 
for. 
Steeman, Dierckx de Casterlé, Godderis, and Grypdonck (2006), in a 
metasynthesis of qualitative studies, found that the experience of living with 
early stage dementia could be described as a transition through prediagnostic, 
diagnostic, and postdiagnostic phases. In the prediagnostic phase, people 
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generally sensed, or were told by people who knew them, that their memory was 
failing (Steeman et al., 2006). To begin with, this was often explained by age or 
stressful living conditions (e.g. Robinson et al., 1997). Gradually, or by 
particular events serving as wake-up calls, people became aware that something 
else must be causing their difficulties. In this phase, they might develop 
strategies to conceal their difficulties and remain in control by avoiding certain 
situations (e.g. Clare, 2002). The pressure of concealing and the need for 
explanation and support eventually caused people to share with others their 
awareness that something was wrong. Family members could also initiate shared 
awareness (Robinson et al., 1997; Keady & Nolan, 1995). Not all, however, 
were willing to acknowledge the problems (Steeman et al., 2006). Denial could 
appear in both family members and the affected people themselves. Awareness 
and denial sometimes occurred simultaneously, and people might be aware, 
however, choose not to discuss the situation with others. 
In the diagnostic phase (Steeman et al., 2006) feelings of anxiety, threat, 
and uncertainty about the future could be intensified. People with dementia 
symptoms who sought medical assessment sometimes described being dismissed 
by health care providers who declared that forgetfulness was a normal condition 
(Holst & Hallberg, 2003). The time from first seeking help to receiving a 
diagnosis often extended over several months, and could imply a strenuous 
period of waiting and oscillating between hope and despair (Samsi et al., 2014). 
The neuropsychological assessments might highlight the magnitude of the 
impairments for the people affected and trigger emotional reactions (Cahill, 
Gibb, Bruce, Headon, & Drury, 2008). The diagnosis could provide an 
explanation for the perceived difficulties and validate the need to be supported, 
but could also cause anger and shock in the people with dementia and their 
family members (Samsi et al., 2014). People with memory problems who were 
admitted to memory clinics for assessment, and their family carers, most 
commonly wished to be informed about their diagnosis and future prospects; 
however, they wanted the information to be given stepwise and adjusted to their 
individual needs (Samsi et al., 2014). 
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In the postdiagnostic phase, people with DD tried to get on with their 
lives and deal with their situation (de Boer et al., 2007; Steeman et al., 2006). 
Maintaining normality was commonly declared important (von Kutzleben, 
Schmid, Halek, Holle, & Bartholomeyczik, 2012). The cognitive impairment 
implied a multitude of losses (Steeman et al., 2006), such as loss of abilities to 
perform previously taken for granted tasks and of independence. People with DD 
described their ability to connect with other people as decreasing, because they 
had difficulties with following conversation and recognizing people, which was 
grieving them (Holst & Hallberg, 2003). Living with cognitive impairment has 
been described as feeling slow, blank, and lost (Phinney & Chesla, 2003), 
meaning that more time than normal was needed to complete tasks and that 
thoughts were slipping away, and experiencing confusion. The world might thus 
feel unpredictable and unfamiliar (Nygård & Borell, 1998). Public environments 
might be especially challenging (Brittain, Corner, Robinson, & Bond, 2010; 
Svanström & Sundler, 2013), and outdoor activities might thus be avoided, 
leading to a sense of decreased freedom. However, familiar surroundings could 
also support and make possible outdoor activities and independent living 
(Brittain et al., 2010; de Witt, Ploeg, & Black, 2009). The loss of ability to drive 
was another cause of loss of independence and a sense of being closed in (de 
Witt et al., 2009). The cognitive impairments made people feel stupid, worthless, 
and ashamed; however, such feelings might also be caused by other people’s 
reactions to them (Steeman et al., 2006). They described their difficulties in 
performing activities having led them to withdraw from doing things that they 
had previously appreciated (Holst & Hallberg, 2003). Living with DD was found 
to imply diminishing social contacts (Nygård & Borell, 1998) and perceived 
social rejection and isolation (Burgener, Buckwalter, Perkhounkova, Liu, Riley, 
et al., 2013). People with DD also worried about the future, in which they not 
only anticipated further deterioration, but also becoming a burden to others and 
being abandoned. Especially the people with younger onset dementia reported 
experiencing a lack of appropriate support from the society (Beattie, Daker-
White, Gilliard, & Means, 2002; von Kutzleben et al., 2012). 
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Recently, the experience of living alone with DD has received particular 
attention (de Witt et al., 2009; de Witt, Ploeg, & Black, 2010; Duane, Brasher, & 
Koch, 2013; Frazer, Oyebode, & Cleary, 2012; Svanström & Sundler, 2013). 
Svanström and Sundler (2013) found that people with DD living alone felt lonely 
and bored, in spite of regularly attending daycare and receiving home help 
services. They reported being reluctant to leave their homes and spending too 
much time in bed. However, not all people living along felt lonely (Duane et al., 
2013). Some felt accompanied by the memory of a diseased spouse, a pet, or a 
social network (Duane et al., 2013). Sitting by the window or at the veranda, 
they made a connection with people passing by (Duane et al., 2013; de Witt et 
al., 2009). By focusing on their remaining abilities, people could maintain a 
sense of achievement and independence (Duane et al., 2013; Frazer et al., 2011). 
People who lived alone were, however, afraid to make mistakes that would lead 
to them being transferred to care homes (de Witt et al., 2009). Some said that 
daycare and memory clubs implied an opportunity to meet socially with other 
people (Frazer et al., 2011; Svanström & Sundler, 2013), while others had 
negative experiences from activity groups and accommodated living (Duane et 
al., 2013) and found the care standardized and not adapted to their individual 
needs. For some people their own homes were strongly connected with positive 
memories, comfort, security, and peace, and they did not look forward to moving 
into a nursing home (de Witt et al., 2009). In a temporal aspect, living alone with 
DD was described as holding back time (de Witt et al., 2010). Time was held 
back by taking medication that delayed deterioration. The future represented 
dreaded time, and the timeliness of giving up things like driving, walking, or 
living alone was frequently mentioned. The people with DD spoke of time as 
limited (de Witt et al., 2010).  
1.6 THE STIGMA OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
Alzheimer’s disease is often associated with shame and stigma (Batsch, 
Mittelman, & Alzheimer’s Disease International, 2012). According to Goffman 
(1963/1990, p. 9) stigma is ‘the situation of the individual who is disqualified 
from full social acceptance’. Many people with AD experience stigma. A web 
 10 
survey conducted by Alzheimer’s Disease International (Batsch et al., 2012) 
showed that people with DD and their family members often encountered 
ignorance, that they found the disease to have negative associations, and that 
they had experienced friends withdrawing from them on account of the disease. 
Because old age is also often negatively stereotyped, many experience double 
stigmatization. The authors of the report concluded: ‘Many people are not only 
affected by the disease itself, but also by the reaction of family and friends’ 
(Batsch et al., 2012, p. 73). Similarly, O’Sullivan, Hocking, and Spence (2013) 
found that other people’s negative attitudes were seen by people with DD as 
obstacles to living positively. Stigma might also prevent people from seeking 
medical help for their difficulties and delay the diagnosis and possible treatment 
(Vernooij-Dassen et al., 2005). Stigma not only affects the people with DD 
themselves, but also their family members, so-called courtesy stigma or stigma 
by association (Werner & Heinik, 2008). The negative view of people with DD 
is not only prevalent in other people but also in the people with DD themselves. 
Negative stereotyping and self-stereotyping have been shown to contribute to a 
decline in the abilities of healthy older people, and probably even more so in 
people with AD (Scholl & Sabat, 2008). Burgener and colleagues, in a 
longitudinal study (Burgener, Buckwalter, Perkhounkova, & Liu, 2013; 
Burgener, Buckwalter, Perkhounkova, Liu, Riley, et al., 2013), found that people 
with higher levels of cognitive functioning scored their perception of social 
rejection and social isolation higher than people with lower levels of cognitive 
functioning (Burgener, Buckwalter, Perkhounkova, Liu, Riley, et al., 2013). 
Higher levels of perceived stigma were associated with poorer quality of life 
outcomes; for example, social rejection was associated with less participation in 
activities, lower health scores, and higher scores on behavioural symptoms and 
anxiety (Burgener, Buckwalter, Perkhounkova, & Liu, 2013). 
1.7 IMPACT OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE ON SENSE OF SELF 
Contributing to the stigma of AD has been the view that people with DD lose 
their selves (Fontana & Smith, 1989), and become ‘empty shells’ or even ‘living 
dead’ (Behuniak, 2011). This view has been prevalent among professionals and 
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researchers as well as in society; however, in the last decades it has been 
increasingly questioned. Studies on the sense of self in people with AD and other 
types of DD were based on various conceptualizations of self, or failed to define 
the self-concept used, and were thus found difficult to compare (Caddell & 
Clare, 2010). A systematic review of the research did not, however, support the 
view that self was lost in people with DD, although some studies indicated that 
the sense of self might decrease or change (Caddell & Clare, 2010). Qualitative 
studies tended to find that self was preserved, while studies performed with 
quantitative methods generally described that self was affected. In the following 
I attempt to give an overview of previous research on sense of self in people with 
Alzheimer’s and other types of DD. The studies have used a variety of terms, 
such as self, selfhood, personhood, identity, and self-identity, which have 
different theoretical origins but designate similar phenomena. For the purpose of 
the following review, I have chosen to see them as synonymous, and to use the 
terms preferred by the authors referred to. When not referring to other research, I 
will use the term self, which is consistent with the theoretical framework I have 
chosen to guide the present research. 
There is a considerable amount of research based on a cognitive view of 
self, in which cognitive ability, especially the autobiographical memory, has 
been seen as a prerequisite for the persistence of self (e.g. Addis & Tippett, 
2004; Haslam, Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese, & Tonks, 2011). Such research 
generally concludes that the sense of self decreases along with the memory in 
people with DD, based on the supposition that remembrance of significant 
people and life events is key to the sense of self. In contrast, Clare and Caddell 
(2013b), in a study of people with early stage DD, found that the relationship 
between autobiographical memory and identity was weak, and likely to be more 
complex than previously assumed. When comparing this group to older people 
without DD, they found very few differences in sense of identity between the 
groups (Caddell & Clare, 2013a). There has also been research indicating that 
people with DD have intact knowledge of their previous selves, but are unable to 
update their self-knowledge with changes occurring since they developed DD 
(Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003; Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009). In this 
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research, people with DD appeared to see themselves as the people they were 
before they had the disease, which was not consistent with how their family 
members presently viewed them. In a study by Cohen-Mansfield, Parpura-Gill, 
and Golander (2006), people with DD reported a higher degree of persistence in 
their self-identity roles than they were perceived by their family members to 
have. The authors discussed several alternative explanations for this finding, 
namely, that the people with DD might be in denial or unable to report 
accurately about their past and present role-identities because of memory 
impairments, or that they might experience more continuity than their families 
realized (Cohen-Mansfield et al., 2006). 
Related to this is the issue of awareness in people with AD. Researchers 
with a biomedical approach (e.g. Snow et al., 2005) have described unawareness 
of disability as a common consequence of the brain damage. Sabat (2002, 2005), 
on the other hand, found that people with AD expressed awareness of their 
impairments as well as related emotional reactions, such as grief and frustration. 
With a psychosocial approach to self, researchers found that people in all stages 
of AD showed awareness of being changed (Clare, 2003; Clare, Rowlands, 
Bruce, Surr, & Downs, 2008). It was concluded that apparent unawareness could 
be seen as a means to manage the disease’s threat to self, rather than as a 
symptom, and that self was maintained by balancing self-maintaining and self-
adjusting strategies (Clare, 2003). In self-maintaining, people with AD were 
striving to maintain their previous view of self, while in self-adjusting, they 
adjusted their view of self in accordance with the change. Caddell and Clare 
(2011) similarly reported that people with AD described simultaneous continuity 
and change in their sense of self, while still feeling basically the same people. 
MacRae (2010) found that at least in the early stage, having AD did not seem to 
be an essential part of how people with AD perceived themselves, and it was not 
mentioned when they were asked the question ‘who are you?’. The common 
answers were instead, a parent, spouse, and decent person. 
An embodied approach to selfhood has been elaborated predominantly 
by Kontos (e.g. 2003, 2004; Kontos & Martin, 2013). Kontos argued that 
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selfhood persists at a pre-reflective level, independent of cognitive impairments. 
She found that people with severe AD ‘were aware of their surroundings, 
engaged with the world, and interacting with coherence, purpose and meaning’ 
(Kontos, 2004, p. 836), and concluded that this indicated persisting selfhood. 
Further, research on episodes of lucidity in people with severe DD support the 
idea that the self is, at least partly, preserved (Normann, Asplund, Karlsson, 
Sandman, & Norberg, 2006). Episodes of lucidity are moments in which people 
who usually appear to be confused suddenly show that they are aware of the 
situation. Such episodes were not uncommon and seem to occur when a closer 
contact is established between the people with DD and their care providers 
(Normann et al., 2006). Other research too, involving people with severe DD, 
showed that they were able to interact with their environment and other people, 
in spite of speech and other impairments (Ericsson, Hellström, & Kjellström, 
2011; Kontos, 2011; Moore, 1999; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010; Ward, Vass, 
Aggarwal, Garfield, & Cybyk, 2008). They were able to use politeness; initiate 
social contact; and display social sensitivity, affectional warmth, and humour 
(Mayhew, Acton, Yauk, & Hopkins, 2001; Temple, Sabat, & Kroger, 1999). 
They were also able to create friendships (Saunders, de Medeiros, Doyle, & 
Mosby, 2012) and be helpful to others (Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sandman, 
Norberg, & Adolfsson, 1988). Some researchers, however, have made a 
distinction between politeness and tact, arguing that people with AD have 
preserved politeness, which is a more routinized behaviour, but not tact, which is 
dependent on the ability to interpret facial expressions (Rhys & Schmidt-
Renfree, 2000).  
Further, there is an increasing amount of research applying a narrative 
perspective of self in DD. According to this view, the sense of self is constructed 
by and expressed in life stories (Bamberg, 2010; McAdams, 2001b). When 
narrating their life stories, people with AD were less detailed than people without 
cognitive impairments. They omitted some, and repeated other, contents and 
were more often mistaken in the chronology (Usita, Hyman Jr, & Herman, 
1998). The stories that were told, though, seemed to hold specific meaning to the 
people telling them, by conveying how they viewed themselves as people 
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(Hydén & Örulv, 2009; Surr, 2006). Hydén (2013) combined a narrative with an 
embodied approach, and described how people with DD and language 
impairment managed to tell their life stories. When words failed them, they used 
body language to fill the gaps. Family members assisted the people with DD by 
scaffolding their stories, namely, helping them by providing facts and coherence 
when necessary. Scaffolding was also prevalent in storytelling occurring 
between two people with DD (Hydén, 2011). Holst and Hallberg (2003), on the 
other hand, described how people with DD appeared to become strangers in their 
own lives, with a fragmented identity, when unable to recall episodes from their 
earlier lives. Their findings appear to underline the value of scaffolding people 
with DD to support their life stories.  Bastings (2003) analysed autobiographies 
written by three people with AD and found that the writers clearly expressed a 
sense of self. Ryan, Bannister, and Anas (2009) found that writing was a way to 
reclaim a social identity for people with DD. 
Much of the research in favour of preserved sense of self in people with 
DD has been influenced by Kitwood (1990, 1997). Kitwood described his 
approach to personhood as ‘transcendental, ethical and social-psychological’ 
(1997, p. 11). He argued that malignant social psychology added significantly to 
the neurobiological factors, in causing an apparent loss of personhood in people 
with DD (1990). The malignant social psychology was manifested in people 
with DD being frequently exposed to, for example, treachery, infantilization, 
intimidation, labelling, and banishing. This treatment, Kitwood (1990) argued, 
contributed to a ‘dementing process’ in the people with DD. Kitwood’s work has 
been criticized for being insufficiently methodologically and philosophically 
underpinned (Adams, 1996; Dewing, 2008); however, his ideas are significant in 
that they initiated a shift from a predominantly biomedical view of people with 
DD to a more person-centred one.  
Among the researchers influenced by Kitwood’s ideas are Sabat and co-
workers, who have applied a social constructionist perspective to self (Harré, 
1998; Sabat & Harré, 1992). In a series of studies, Sabat and colleagues explored 
how malignant social psychology affected the possibilities of people with AD to 
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construct positive social personae (Sabat, 2002, 2005; Sabat & Harré, 1992; 
Sabat, Napolitano, & Fath, 2004; Sabat, Fath, Moghaddam, & Harré, 1999). 
They found that other people tended to focus on the impairments rather than the 
remaining abilities of people with AD. This implied that the social persona of 
burdensome and dysfunctional was often constructed (Sabat, 2002). To 
counteract a feeling of shortcoming and maintain their self-esteem, people with 
AD emphasized their previous healthier attributes in conversations with others 
(Sabat et al., 1999). People with AD were sometimes hindered by their family 
members from partaking in daily activities, which deprived them of 
opportunities to manifest the abilities they still possessed (Sabat & Harré, 1992). 
Other people also tended to interpret mistakes and emotional reactions in the 
people with AD as symptoms, though they were sometimes occasional mistakes 
and natural reactions to difficult situations (Sabat et al., 2004). Other researchers 
too have described how people with DD were striving to construct satisfactory 
social selves. For example, Steeman, Godderis, Grypdonck, de Bal, and Dierckx 
de Casterlé (2007), in a longitudinal study conducted over a period of 10–12 
months, found that people with DD struggled to be someone of value. Their 
focus shifted, however, over time from a desire to be valued for what they did to 
being valued for who they were (Steeman, Tournoy, Grypdonck, Godderis, & 
Dierckx de Casterlé, 2013). Further, Frazer and colleagues (2011) described how 
women with DD who lived alone were constantly re-constructing their selves by 
keeping socially active. 
Researchers with a social constructionist approach have also studied how 
people express their sense of self by the use of first person pronouns (I, me, etc.). 
They have found that, even with severe impairments, people with AD used first 
person pronouns to the same extent as people without DD (Fazio & Mitchell, 
2009; Sabat, 2002; Sabat & Harré, 1992; Tappen, Williams, Fishman, & Touhy, 
1999). Self was also expressed with gestures and other acts, for example, when 
people with DD guarded their spaces (Sabat & Harré, 1992) or smiled at hearing 
their names (Kelly, 2007). 
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There has been less research on how people with DD look upon their 
future selves. The concept of possible selves has been proposed to designate 
‘individuals’ ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, 
and what they are afraid of becoming’ (Marcus & Nurius, 1986, p. 954). Cotrell 
and Hooker (2005) found that people with AD expressed feared and hoped-for 
possible future selves in similar ways to healthy older people, although their 
hopes and fears were more related to AD. There was a balance between hoped-
for and feared selves. The Alzheimer-related possible selves concerned hope for 
retained independence versus fear of becoming dependent; hope for staying the 
same versus fear of changing; hope to retain abilities, skills, and memory versus 
fear of losing the same (Cotrell & Hooker, 2005). 
1.8 NURSING CARE AND SUPPORT OF PEOPLE WITH 
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
In the absence of curative treatment, nursing care and social support of people 
with AD and their families are often crucial to sustain their well-being. 
According to Swedish official recommendations (National Board of Health and 
Welfare, 2010), people with DD should be offered daycare and residential living 
in accordance with their specific needs. Support for family members should also 
be offered. It is stated that care should be person-centred and performed by 
multi-professional teams (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). There is 
a vast amount of research available on nursing care and support of people with 
DD in various stages and their families. Support described in the literature that is 
directed towards people with mild and moderate AD includes, for example, aids 
to facilitate recall, communication, and decision-making (Murphy & Oliver, 
2013); counselling offered to people with AD individually and together with 
family members (Sørensen, Waldorff, & Waldemar, 2008); cognitive stimulation 
therapy (Spector, Gardner, & Orrell, 2011); reminiscence therapy (Woods, 
Spector, Jones, Orrell, & Davies, 2005); validation therapy (Feil, 1992; Neal & 
Barton Wright, 2003); psychotherapy (e.g. Cheston & Jones, 2009); activity 
groups (e.g. Phinney & Moody, 2011); groups aiming to support health, 
knowledge, and coping (e.g. Buettner & Fitzsimmons, 2009); and mutual 
support groups (Yale, 1995). A more detailed description of various 
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interventions is beyond the scope of the present thesis, and I will confine myself 
to describe support groups as they were formed in the present research. 
Support groups, as they occur in the present thesis, are characterized by 
their reliance primarily on peer support. Such groups have predominantly been 
available for family members and not for the people with AD themselves. With 
the pioneering work of Yale (1995), support groups started to also be more 
common for the people who have AD. They are generally less structured than 
other group activities directed to people with DD and the group facilitators have 
a different role. The topics are determined by the participants, although there are 
sometimes predetermined topics to get the group discussions started (Yale, 
1995). The facilitator’s role is supportive, rather than therapeutic. Yale (1995) 
advocated that facilitators, nevertheless, should be health care or social services 
professionals who were able to give advice when requested and needed. The 
need for facilitators to be knowledgeable in assisting aphasic participants in 
communicating has also been emphasized (e.g. Goldfein, 2007). Support groups 
led by participants with AD, merely receiving support from professionals with 
practical arrangements, have also been described (e.g. Örulv, 2012).  
Many people in the early stage of AD appreciate having access to support 
groups (Reed & Bluethmann, 2008). The US National Alzheimer’s Association 
(2007), in a review, found that support group programmes were generally 
directed towards people with early stage DD and often included both education 
and social support. Some programmes also included family members. In spite of 
weak scientific evidence, support groups were recommended for people with 
early stage DD. It was emphasized that support groups should not be limited to 
eight or ten weeks, which was common (National Alzheimer’s Association, 
2007), but needed to be ongoing or followed by other forms of support. 
Although support groups have generally been offered to people with early stage 
DD, there have been positive experiences reported from support groups for 
people with more severe impairment as well (Theurer, Wister, Sixsmith, 
Chaudhury, & Lovegreen, 2012; Åkerlund & Norberg, 1986).  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Two theoretical frameworks have been of particular importance for this thesis. 
From the outset I have used Harré’s theories of self (1998) and positioning 
(Davies & Harré, 1990) as sensitizing frameworks. Sensitizing frameworks are 
theories and concepts that are used to guide the data collection and sometimes 
the analysis of data, providing directions for ‘what to look for’ in research 
(Patton, 2002, p. 276). In substudy II, I also adopted the concepts agency and 
communion (Bakan, 1966), as further elaborated by McAdams and colleagues 
(e.g. McAdams, 1988; McAdams, Hoffman, Mansfield, & Day, 1996), as a 
framework for organizing the data. In this section, I intend to describe and justify 
the choice of theoretical frameworks.  
2.1 PERSONS, IDENTITIES, AND SELVES 
The scientific interest from various research domains concerning self and related 
concepts has increased in the recent decades (Leary & Tangney, 2012), and there 
is a vast amount of theoretical work available on the subject (for overviews, see, 
e.g., de Medeiros, 2004; Leary & Tangney, 2012; Schwartz, Luyckx, & 
Vignoles, 2011; Glas, 2006; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; Swann & 
Bosson, 2010). The terms person, personhood, self, selfhood, and identity are 
often used interchangeably. They are also related to other terms such as 
consciousness (Searle, 2005) and personality (Glas, 2006). This section attempts 
to give a brief account of how the concepts are generally defined.  
Some researchers have seen self and identity as inseparable concepts, 
while others have argued that they hold different meanings (Vignoles, Schwartz, 
& Luyckx, 2011). Leary and Tangney (2012, p. 6) define self as ‘the set of 
psychological mechanisms or processes that allow organisms to think 
consciously about themselves’. Included in this definition are the subjective, 
objective, and executive selves. The subjective self, the ‘I’, is the self that 
experiences itself and the world. The objective self is the ‘me’, the things which 
‘I’ experience about myself, and the executive is how ‘I’ control and regulate 
myself. The distinction between ‘I-self’, also called ‘self-as-knower’, and ‘me-
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self’, also termed ‘self-as-known’, was introduced by James (1890) and further 
elaborated by Mead (1934/1967). Because Leary and Tangney’s definition of 
self is wide, they recommend the use of hyphenated self terms, such as self-
awareness, self-cognition, and so on, to specify the kind of self that is referred to. 
According to Leary and Tangney (2012) the term person refers to the total 
person who has a self. Self is thus a part of the person, and self and person are 
not synonymous. Identity is not clearly defined by Leary and Tangney (2012); 
however, they appear to view identity as the way people define themselves, their 
beliefs about themselves, and their attributes (pp. 11–12). Identity would then be 
equivalent to the cognitive ‘me’ self, thus a part of self.  
According to Vignoles and co-workers (2011, p. 2), the term identity 
basically refers to how people answer the question ‘who are you?’. This 
definition appears to correspond well with Leary and Tangney’s view of identity. 
The answer to this question can be given at an individual, relational, and 
collective level (Vignoles et al., 2011). The individual level includes, for 
example, values, beliefs, self-esteem, and the past and possible future selves. The 
relational level concerns who people are and wish to be in relation to other 
people (e.g. daughter, spouse, pupil). Collective identity refers to the groups and 
categories people belong to based on, for example, gender and ethnicity. 
According to Vignoles and co-workers (2011), self, or at least some aspects of 
self, might belong under the umbrella of identity, which is opposite to the 
apparent view of Leary and Tangney, who seemed to see self as the umbrella and 
identity as subordinate. As concluded by Vignoles and co-workers, there is 
clearly a need to further clarify how the two concepts are related to each other.  
Person has been defined as 
a conscious, reflexive, embodied, self-transcending center of 
subjective experience, durable identity, moral commitment, and 
social communication who – as the efficient cause of his or her 
own responsible actions and interactions – exercises complex 
capacities for agency and intersubjectivity in order to develop and 
sustain his or her own incommunicable self in loving 
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relationships with other personal selves and with the nonpersonal 
world. (Smith, 2010, p. 61)  
The definition includes both identity and self, and is thus coherent with Leary 
and Tangney’s view of person as the total person, referred to above. 
In short it can be concluded that the term person commonly refers to 
individuals who are distinct from each other, involving embodied, self-reflexive, 
moral, agentic, and relational aspects. Self is the psychological mechanisms 
(attentional, cognitive, and executive processes) which allow people to self-
reflect, and identity is the answer to the question ‘who are you’ on the personal, 
relational, and collective levels. 
2.2  HARRÉ’S THEORIES OF PERSON, SELF AND POSITIONING 
In the present research, self has been defined in accordance with Rom Harré’s 
theoretical works on person, self (Harré, 1998), and positioning (Davies & 
Harré, 1990). The theories have been previously used in research on self in 
people with DD (e.g. Fazio & Mitchell, 2009; Sabat & Harré, 1992; Small, 
Geldart, Gutman, & Scott, 1998; Tappen et al., 1999; Westius, Kallenberg, & 
Norberg, 2010). Harré’s social constructionist approach to self is useful in this 
field, because it sets the focus on the relational aspects of self, that is, how the 
approach of other people towards people with AD affects the sense of self in 
people with AD.  
Although Harré often uses the terms self, selfhood, personhood, and 
identity interchangeably, in this work the term self will be favoured, because the 
core of Harré’s theory is in the concepts Selves 1–3. It is possible, though, that 
the term identity would have been equally or more appropriate. Harré also seems 
to consider this (Harré, 1998, p. 6), but concludes by discouraging the use of 
identity, because it commonly refers to collective identities. 
Influenced by Wittgenstein (1953/1992) and Vygotsky (1934/1986), 
Harré’s theories build on weak social constructionism, which implies that some 
phenomena are seen as realities and some as socially constructed (Hacking, 
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2000; Harré, 2002). The body, including the nervous system being the site of 
cognitive and emotional processes, is a reality, and not constructed, according to 
Harré. However, he refutes the idea of a soul as an entity residing in the body: 
‘[T]he self, as the singularity we each feel ourselves to be, is not an entity. 
Rather it is a site, a site from which a person perceives the world and a place 
from which to act. There are only persons. Selves are grammatical fictions, 
necessary characteristics of person-oriented discourses’ (Harré, 1998, pp. 3–4). 
The body thus constitutes the ‘viewpoint’ from which people see and interact 
with their surrounding environments and construct their selves. Persons are 
embodied and publicly identifiable human beings, who are situated in space and 
time. They can be distinguished from other people, and are the same throughout 
time. Even if they are sometimes mistaken for other people, and might change in 
various ways, persons continue to be the same, discernible entities. 
Self is how people talk (and think) about themselves (Harré, 1998). Harré 
describes self as tripartite, Selves 1–3. Self 1 is people’s expression of the ‘I’, 
their subjective perspective. This is the embodied, personal viewpoint from 
which they think, act, and speak. This perspective is singular (at least in mentally 
healthy people), meaning that each person has only one basic perspective, one 
‘I’. Self 2 is the objective, the ‘me’ perspective. It is how ‘I’ speak (and think) 
about ‘me’. It includes their personal attributes, such as personal preferences, 
moral values, beliefs, character traits, and beliefs about those attributes. It also 
includes their life histories, concerning, for example, their backgrounds and 
experiences. Self 2 is multiple, and sometimes ambivalent and contradictory. It is 
fully possible, for example, to speak of oneself as simultaneously possessing 
contradictory character traits. Self 2 can be seen as restricted and unrestricted. 
The restricted Self 2 concerns how people perceive themselves to be in the 
moment, while the unrestricted Self 2 also includes past and possible future 
selves. Once a nurse, for example, people might always in some way consider 
themselves nurses, even if they are no longer in their professions. Self 3 is the 
display of Selves 1 and 2 to other people, the social personae. These too are 
multiple. People display a range of personae, depending on the situation and 
other people involved. People might be parents, students, spouses, employed 
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persons, and so on simultaneously. These are commonly referred to as roles 
(Goffman, 1959). 
In the positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990; van Langenhove & 
Harré, 1999), it is further elaborated what happens in the social display and 
recognition of Selves 3. Instead of role, Davies and Harré (1990) introduced the 
term position, which they consider to better accounts for the fluid character of 
how people display themselves and are seen by others. There are three central 
concepts in the positioning theory: position, speech act, and storyline. Storyline 
refers to ‘a mutually agreed upon context which can [be] called the narrative 
convention’ (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p. 9), that is how people generally 
speak and think about themselves and other people. Each of the three concepts is 
involved in the social construction of self. In social interaction, people position 
themselves (display selected aspects of Self 2) in accordance with how they 
think about themselves and what they believe is expected from them (their 
personal and the shared storylines). The positioning is often done by speech acts, 
but it is also possible, for example, to position oneself by gestures and display of 
material assets. The speech (and other) acts, like the positions people seek to 
manifest, are also determined by prevailing storylines and positions, in that the 
positions that people already hold vis-à-vis others determine what can be said, 
and not. In the position of parent, for example, it is possible to say things other 
than those that can be said in the position of employee. The initial (first-order) 
positions taken by people might be sustained, rejected, or adjusted by other 
people (second order positioning or re-positioning), according to how they 
perceive that the first-order positions adhere to their perception of prevailing 
positions and storylines. The initial positions are thus negotiated and modified 
back and forth in the discourse. In this process, the prevailing storylines are 
modified, and new storylines sometimes constructed. 
As already argued, the social constructionist approach to self, when it is 
applied to people with AD, sets the focus on crucial issues. The stigmatization of 
DD implies that the prevailing negative storylines of people with DD position 
them as weak, confused, unreliable, and so on. The power of the prevailing 
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storylines makes it difficult for people with AD to position themselves and 
receive acceptance for more positive positions. Additionally, their impairments 
often limit their ability to perform speech and other acts in positioning 
themselves. From a social constructionist perspective, this has been seen as 
contributing to an erosion of self in people with DD. However, it has also been 
argued that the self can be sustained, with better attention to the way people with 
AD are treated (Sabat & Harré, 1992). 
2.3 AGENCY AND COMMUNION THEORY 
Agency and communion have been described by Bakan (1966, pp. 14–15) as 
‘two fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms, agency for the 
existence of an organism as an individual, and communion for the participation 
of the individual in some larger organism of which the individual is a part’. 
Building on the works of Tillich (1951/1981), Bakan viewed agency and 
communion as the major motivational forces and matters of ultimate concern to 
people. They have also been seen as character traits of individuals and groups 
(e.g. Suitner & Maass, 2008). Agency implies a quest for autonomy, self-
realization, and separation from other people, while communion is the urge to be 
connected and unified with others. In a study of spontaneous self-representations 
in adults (Diehl, Owen, & Youngblade, 2004), expressions of communion were 
more prevalent than expressions of agency. Agency was more prevalent in 
younger people and men, whereas communion was more prevalent in older 
people and women (Diehl et al., 2004). The two are not necessarily 
contradictory; it was possible to be simultaneously highly agentic and communal 
(Suitner & Maass, 2008). Agency and communion were found to be associated 
with well-being (Helgeson, 1994) and a good life for people with AD 
(Zingmark, Sandman, & Norberg, 2002). 
McAdams and co-workers (McAdams, 1988; McAdams et al., 1996; 
McAdams, 2001a) found that agency and communion were two general 
dimensions occurring in people’s life stories and developed a coding scheme for 
agency and communion expressed in life stories. Originally, the coding scheme 
consisted of both positive and negative experiences (McAdams, 1988, pp. 158–
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159). In later versions the negative themes were not included. The reason for this 
is unclear. It is simply stated that ‘affectively negative scenes . . . are not readily 
coded in a manner analogous to positive events’ (McAdams et al., 1996, p. 345). 
It appears likely that McAdams and co-workers have refrained from further 
developing the negative themes because they were less significant to their main 
research interest, which has been to explore the motivational forces of people.  
The positive agency themes are self-mastery, status/victory, 
achievement/responsibility, and power/impact, and the negative, 
failure/weakness, losing face, ignorance, and conflict (McAdams et al., 1996). 
The positive communion themes are love/friendship, dialogue, caring/help, and 
unity/togetherness, whereas the negative are separation, rejection, 
disillusionment about people, and another’s misfortune (McAdams, 1988). 
Self-mastery refers to people striving to enhance their autonomy – to 
master, strengthen, and empower themselves. Status/victory is about making an 
impact on others, enhancing one’s status, and experiencing success that is 
witnessed by other people. It involves an aspect of competition. 
Achievement/responsibility concerns more longstanding efforts that are 
eventually successful. It also concerns accepting and carrying out 
responsibilities. Power/impact means being empowered by significant others. 
These might be parents, teachers, mentors, or higher powers (McAdams et al., 
1996).  
Failure/weakness is about experiencing failure and being unable to do 
things because of some weakness within oneself. Losing face concerns when 
people experience social humiliation and embarrassment. Ignorance means 
experiencing lack of knowledge or confusion. Conflict concerns being in conflict 
or disagreement with other people (McAdams, 1988, p. 158).  
Love/friendship refers to positive and reciprocal relationships on equal 
terms, in contrast to caring/help, which refers to helping and caring for others. 
Dialogue concerns meaningful and noninstrumental conversations with others. 
These might be both casual chats and the sharing of more personal matters. 
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Unity/togetherness refers to the feeling of relatedness to other people, to a group, 
and to society, and to feeling accepted and cared for by others (McAdams et al., 
1996; McAdams, 2001). 
 Separation concerns being unwillingly separated from other people by 
various causes. Rejection means being rejected by people whom one wishes to 
be united with. Disillusionment about people refers to being disappointed with 
how one has been treated by someone else. Another’s misfortune concerns 
feeling sad or burdened on behalf of other people (McAdams, 1988, pp. 158–
159). 
In the analysis of the expressions of Self 2 in the support group 
conversations (substudy II), agency and communion appeared to be frequently 
expressed in the data. I thus adopted the concepts as a theoretical framework to 
guide the further analysis. I chose McAdams’s coding scheme, because it 
concretized and operationalized the wider and more elusive concepts of agency 
and communion, and offered a research-based system to categorize the data. 
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3 RATIONALE 
The social constructionist perspective on self highlights the importance of people 
with AD receiving support in preserving a positive sense of self. Previous studies 
using this approach are few, and built on few participants. There is also a 
shortage of research concerning how people with AD co-construct a sense of self 
in communication with each other. To deepen the understanding of how people 
with AD view themselves, and display their self and identity in various 
situations, interviews have been conducted with people with AD who attended 
two support groups. Their expressions of self are related to theories of self and 
identity, primarily to Harré’s theories of self (1998) and positioning (Davies & 
Harré, 1990). Extended knowledge in this field will enhance the possibilities for 
nurses and other professionals to frame care and support to people with AD and 
their families that enables them to preserve and enhance their sense of self. 
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4 AIMS 
The overall aim of the thesis was to describe, in accordance with Harré’s theories 
of self (1998) and positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990), how people with 
Alzheimer’s disease expressed their sense of self in interviews and in support 
groups with other people with Alzheimer’s disease. The aims of the four 
substudies were the following: 
 
I. To use Harré’s theory of selfhood to describe how people with 
mild and moderate Alzheimer’s disease express their sense of 
self, and thus expand the research in this field 
II. To describe in accordance with Harré’s theory of self how 
people with Alzheimer’s disease express their Self 2, that is, 
their personal attributes and life histories, in a support group 
with other people with Alzheimer’s disease and with a 
facilitator experienced in communicating with people with 
Alzheimer’s disease 
III. To describe in accordance with positioning theory how people 
with moderate Alzheimer’s disease position themselves and 
each other in a support group for people with Alzheimer’s 
disease 
IV. To describe how people with Alzheimer’s disease express their 
experience of being a research participant and to discuss the 
findings in terms of Harré’s theory of self 
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5 DESIGN AND METHODS 
The research project has a qualitative, descriptive, and theory-testing approach 
and consists of four substudies (hereafter referred to as I–IV). An overview of 
the substudies is provided in Table 1. Harré’s theories of self (1998) and 
positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990) have served as a theoretical framework 
throughout the work. The project was part of a larger project aiming to provide 
and evaluate identity-promoting support groups for people with Alzheimer’s 
disease and their family members. The present research project was, however, 
not evaluative. 
The overall project was planned and conducted in collaboration between 
a research unit and a non-profit care organization, which among other services 
also arranged a monthly Alzheimer’s café (cf. Miesen & Jones, 2004) in 
cooperation with the Swedish branch of the Alzheimer’s Association. The 
visitors of the café were informed about the overall project and invited to 
participate. Support groups were arranged, with people with AD and their family 
members simultaneously attending parallel groups in the same premises, 
followed by joint coffee sessions. Each group met ten times over a period of 
eight months.  
5.1 PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The participants in the substudies included in this thesis were 13 people with AD 
participating in two of the support groups (hereafter referred to as A and B) from 
the overall project. They volunteered after receiving the information at the 
Alzheimer’s café. All who volunteered were included. Inclusion criteria were 
having AD (self-declared) and being able to manage group conversation (judged 
by the managers of the café who knew them). Five participants were women and 
eight men. Their median age was 66 years (range 58–80). Six participants had 
education on a secondary level and seven held university degrees. Eleven 
participants were cohabiting with spouses and two lived alone. Eleven 
participants had AD with early onset and two had AD with late onset. They had 
been living with the diagnosis for 1–10 years (median 3). All participant were
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Table 1 Overview of substudies involving participants with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
Substudy Aim Participants Data Analysis 
I To use Harré’s theory of selfhood to describe how 
people with mild and moderate AD express their 
sense of self, and thus expand the research in this 
field 
12 people with AD 
(participant no 13 
excluded from this 
substudy) 
Interviews (n = 12) conducted 
before support group 
participation 
Qualitative deductive content 
analysis inspired by Patton (2002) 
II To describe in accordance with Harré’s theory of self 
how people with AD express their Self 2, i.e. their 
personal attributes and life histories, in a support 
group with other people with AD and with a facilitator 
experienced in communicating with people with AD 
5 of the 
participants from 
substudy I, forming 
support group A 
Support group conversations 
( = 10) 
Qualitative abductive content 
analysis inspired by Peirce (1955) 
and Råholm (2010), and using 
coding scheme for agency and 
communion (McAdams, 1988; 
McAdams et al., 1996) 
III To describe in accordance with positioning theory how 
people with moderate AD position themselves and 
each other in a support group for people with AD 
The same as in 
substudy II 
Secondary analysis of the 
data from substudy II 
Qualitative inductive content 
analsysis insprired by Downe-
Wamboldt (1992) 
IV To describe how people with AD express their 
experience of being a research participant and to 
discuss the findings in terms of Harré’s theory of self 
13 people with AD 
(including those of 
substudy I), 
forming support 
groups A and B 
Partly secondary analysis. 
Interviews before (n = 13, 12 
of which were from substudy 
I) and after (n = 10) support 
group participation. Support 
group conversations (n = 20, 
10 of which were from 
substudy II) 
Qualitative inductive content 
analysis inspired by Downe-
Wamboldt (1992) 
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living in their own homes. Seven participants were assisted only by family 
members, and the remaining six participants also received care in the form of 
home help services and/or adult daycare. The two support groups included five 
(Group A) and eight (Group B) of the participants, respectively. To provide 
demographic facts, the participants’ degrees of cognitive impairment were 
assessed with the Cognitive Performance Scale (CPS; see below) at the start and 
end (approximately nine months after the first assessment) of the project period. 
At the beginning three participants were assessed as mildly impaired (CPS 2) 
and ten as moderately impaired (CPS 3). At the end two participants were 
assessed as mildly and eight as moderately impaired. The remaining three 
participants were not assessed (one could not participate in the assessment 
because of progressing symptoms and nursing home admission, one was 
seriously ill from disease other than AD, and one declined to have his interview 
recorded). An overview of the participants’ characteristics and involvement in 
the substudies is presented in Table 2. 
5.2 THE COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE SCALE 
The most commonly used measure of cognitive impairment is the Mini-Mental 
State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). However, 
because such tests might contribute to an erosion of self-esteem in people with 
AD by emphasizing their deficits (Hellström et al., 2007), a less intrusive scale 
was chosen. The CPS (Morris et al., 1994) consists of five items from the 
Minimum Data Set (MDS; Hawes et al., 1995), which in turn consists of items 
from the Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI; Morris et al., 1990). RAI has 
been tested in Sweden with an inter-rater reliability that was adequate or 
excellent on 76.1% of the items (Sgadari et al., 1997). It corresponds well with 
the MMSE (Hartmaier et al., 1995). The items included in the CPS are comatose, 
short-term memory, understood by others, cognitive skills for daily decision-
making, self-performance in eating, and ability to communicate. The outcome 
scores range 0–6 (0 = Intact, 6 = Very Severe Impairment). In the present 
research, questions concerning the CPS items were included in the interviews 
held with the participants and their family members at the beginning and end of
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1 Male 78 University Cohabitant 1 Moderate X X X 
2 Female 67 Secondary Cohabitant 5 Mild/moderate X X X 
3 Female 59 Secondary Cohabitant 2 Moderate X X X 
4 Female 65 University Single 10 Moderate X X X 
5 Male 60 University Cohabitant 2 Mild   X 
6 Female 63 Secondary Cohabitant 1 Mild X  X 
7 Male 63 Secondary Cohabitant 2 Moderate/not assessed X X X 
8 Female 58 Secondary Single 6 Moderate X  X 
9 Male 68 University Cohabitant 3 Moderate X  X 
10 Male 80 University Cohabitant 3 Moderate/not assessed X  X 
11 Male 63 University Cohabitant 5 Moderate X  X 
12 Male 69 Secondary Cohabitant 4 Moderate X  X 
13 Male 68 University Cohabitant 3 Moderate/not assessed X  X 
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the project (see below). The assessment was made by the author, who is a nurse 
with several years of experience in geriatric and residential care. The coding and 
scoring rules stated by Morris et al. (1994) guided the assessment.  
5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The data consisted of semistructured interviews conducted with participants 
before (I) and after (IV) their support group participation. It also consisted of 
support group conversations (II–IV). The interviews and support group 
conversations were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Methods to 
facilitate communication with people with language impairments due to AD 
were applied in the data collection. Table 3 provides an overview of the data 
included in each substudy. 
Table 3 Overview of data included in the substudies 
Data Study I Study II Study III Study IV 
Interviews before 
support groups 
started (n = 13) 
12 
included* 
  All 13 included 
Support group 
conversations, 
group A (n = 10) 
 Included Included Included 
Support group 
conversations, 
group B (n = 10) 
   Included 
Interviews at end 
of project (n = 10) 
   Included 
*One interview excluded because it was conjoint with the interview of the participant’s 
spouse. 
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5.3.1 Qualitative semistructured interviews 
Interviews were chosen as a method of data collection, because they give access 
to the personal views and perspectives of research participants (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 1), that is, their expressions of sense of self. The qualitative 
research interview is a conversation between the researcher and the participant, 
in which the topics are determined by the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, 
p. 24). To ensure that the same topics were addressed with all participants, a 
semistructured interview format with use of an interview guide was chosen. 
While providing a certain amount of structure, this format also allows the 
researcher freedom to explore issues within predetermined topics in greater 
depth (Patton, 2002, pp. 343–344). Before the support groups started (I) and 
approximately three weeks after they ended (IV), all participants were 
interviewed by the researchers (including myself). The interviews concerned the 
participants’ life histories, sense of self, social relations, experience with AD, 
and view of life. In the concluding interviews the participants were also asked 
how they had experienced participating in the support groups and what else had 
happened in their lives since the first interview took place (the interview guides 
for the initial and concluding interviews are contained in Appendices 1 and 2). 
The participants chose the location for the interviews, predominantly their own 
homes. A few interviews also took place in undisturbed premises at the 
researcher’s work place or the participant’s daycare centre. In two of the 
interviews (one initial and one concluding), a spouse was present and 
simultaneously interviewed. In the analysis of the initial interviews (I) the joint 
interview was omitted because of its different character. The presence of the 
spouse was considered to have a possible impact on how the participant with AD 
accounted for the experience of living with the condition, for example, its impact 
on family relationships. For the purpose of substudy IV (concerning experiences 
of research participation) the presence of the spouse was considered less likely to 
impact the data, and the concluding interview that was conjoint with the spouse 
was thus included (IV). The initial 13 interviews had a median length of 34 
minutes (range 20–50), and the concluding ten interviews had a median length of 
33 minutes (range 21–35). When the concluding interviews were conducted, two 
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participants dropped out because of progressing AD or severe other illness, and 
one declined to record the interview.  
5.3.2 Support group conversations 
The ten sessions with each of the two support groups A (II and III) and B (IV) 
were audio-recorded. Each session lasted one hour. This resulted in a total of 20 
hours of recorded group conversation. As a doctoral student, I participated in the 
support group sessions, but tried to interfere as little as possible with the group. I 
responded when I was directly addressed by participants, assisted the facilitator, 
and shared information about the research project when needed. After each 
session I made notes about nonverbal communication that had occurred in the 
group (e.g. facial expressions, glances, and gestures), and other communication 
which had not been recorded (for example, occurring when participants had 
coffee after the sessions). The notes also included reflections about possible 
meaning of data. The notes were used (to a limited degree) to support 
interpretations in the analysis of group interaction in substudy III. 
The facilitators of the support groups had knowledge about the 
communicational difficulties connected with AD and were experienced in 
communicating with people with AD. The facilitator of support group A was an 
enrolled nurse working at a daycare unit for people with DD, where validation 
(cf. Feil, 1992; Söderlund, Norberg, & Hansebo, 2012) and reminiscence (cf. 
Woods et al., 2005) methods were applied in their daily work. The facilitators of 
support group B were initially (sessions 1–3 and 5) two people working for the 
Swedish Alzheimer’s Association as advocates and counsellors. The remaining 
sessions were facilitated by one of the project managers from the nonprofit care 
organization, who had a background similar to the facilitator of support group A. 
Prior to starting the support groups the facilitators (including the project 
managers) were given information about Harré’s theory of self. They also 
received regular supervision during the project from one of the senior researchers 
involved in the project (Professor Astrid Norberg), to enhance their ability to 
notice and support the participants’ expressions of self in the group. The 
facilitators also opened and ended the group sessions, made sure that all 
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participants had opportunities to be heard in the group, and assisted participants 
in case of communicational difficulties. There was no predetermined agenda of 
topics. The facilitators invited the participants to suggest topics, and also 
suggested topics themselves. Topics suggested by the facilitators were mostly 
related to the participants’ experiences of living with AD and of participating in 
the support groups.  
5.3.3 Methods to facilitate conversation 
Alzheimer’s disease commonly causes communicational difficulties due to 
reduced attention span, and difficulties encoding and retrieving information 
(Bayles, 2003). In the present research this was manifested in participants 
sometimes forgetting what was being talked about (‘losing the thread’), failing to 
find intended words, and misinterpreting communication. The difficulties were 
not substantial, but occurred. To compensate for communicational difficulties, 
methods to facilitate communication were applied by the interviewers and 
support group facilitators. Those included, for example, speaking about one topic 
at a time, avoiding long and complex sentences and excessive use of pronouns, 
speaking at a moderate rate, minimizing disturbance, and avoiding calling 
attention to errors and asking questions that required intact memory functions to 
answer (Bayles, 2003). When the meaning of communication was unclear, 
indirect repair (Gentry & Fisher, 2007) was used. This means that the 
interlocutor interprets what has been said and asks the speaker to confirm the 
interpretation, for example, by saying ‘If I understood you correctly, you meant 
that…?’ This enables both parties to establish shared understanding of what has 
been communicated. Indirect repair has also been found to increase the 
coherence of speech in people with AD (Gentry & Fisher, 2007). 
5.4 ANALYSIS 
Qualitative content analysis was performed in all substudies (I–IV), with 
deductive (I), abductive (II), and inductive (III and IV) approaches. In substudy 
III, and partly in IV, secondary analyses were performed of data previously 
analysed in substudies I and II. Selves 2 and 3 were intertwined and not easily 
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separated in the analyses. In the interviews and support group conversations, 
when participants spoke about their attributes, their beliefs about their attributes, 
and their life histories, they expressed Self 2 to other people. Because Self 3 is 
defined as the social display of Self 2 (Harré, 1998), all data could thus have 
been seen as expressions of Self 3. In substudy I, the accounts of attributes, 
beliefs about attributes, and life histories were nevertheless categorized as Self 2, 
and the accounts of their interactions with other people as Self 3. In substudies II 
and III, however, all this was categorized as Self 2 (II), and the actual interaction 
that occurred in the support group was analysed as Self 3 (III).  
5.4.1 Content analysis 
Content analysis is a method for analysing text originating from the 18th century 
(Krippendorff, 1980/2013). With Berelson’s seminal work ‘Content analysis in 
communication research’ (1952/1971), content analysis was spread to a wider 
range of research areas. Initially, content analysis was concerned with the 
quantification of qualitative data. According to Berelson, ‘content analysis is a 
research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of 
the manifest content of communication’ (1952/1971, p. 18). Berelson’s 
definition was soon criticized for being reductionist, and not taking into account 
the inherent meanings of text (Kracauer, 1952; Krippendorff, 1980/2013). 
Krippendorff (1980, pp. 22–24) argued that there is never but one meaning of 
communication and that meaning is often not shared between people. People 
interpret their own meanings, and are influenced by their contexts in doing so. 
Thus, communication needs to be seen as symbolic and contextual. The terms 
‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ are often used in the literature to describe the level of 
abstraction in the analysis (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Graneheim & Lundman, 
2004; Krippendorff, 1980). While manifest content deals with ‘what the text 
says’, latent content is ‘what the text talks about’ (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004, 
p. 106), which is a higher level of interpretation. From a social constructionist 
perspective, meaning is constructed rather than inherent. The terms manifest and 
latent are unfortunate, since they suggest that there are certain given meanings 
that are either obvious or concealed in the data. This is also not consistent with 
  37 
the view of meaning as constructed, which Krippendorff himself outlines (see 
above). In this thesis the terms explicit and interpreted meaning have been used 
instead of manifest and latent to denominate a lower versus higher degree of 
interpretation.  
Content analysis also refers more generally to the analytical procedures 
commonly used in qualitative research. According to Patton (2002), content 
analysis is ‘any qualitative data reduction or sense-making effort that takes a 
volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and 
meanings’ (p. 453). Those techniques are similar in, for example, grounded 
theory, ethnography, and phenomenological research. Patton argues that, 
although manuals can give some advice on how to perform the analysis in 
qualitative research, this is a creative process in which the data ultimately 
determine what steps are taken. The quality of the findings thus depends heavily 
on the skills of the researcher (Patton, 2002, pp. 432–434). 
Qualitative content analysis has been frequently used in nursing research 
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
The method is generally considered as flexible and pragmatic (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005), which makes it compatible with various philosophical 
assumptions and applicable to various types of data. According to Krippendorff 
(2004, p. 77), the method is suitable ‘when analysts address linguistically 
constituted social realities that are rooted in the kinds of conversations that 
produce the texts being analyzed’. This is in line with the social constructionist 
perspective of this thesis. Qualitative content analysis is also well suited to 
analysing the communication of people with AD. Other qualitative methods, for 
example phenomenology, often require more in-depth interviews (Patton, 2002, 
p. 104). Such data might be difficult to obtain from people with cognitive and 
language impairments. Content analysis, however, can be performed with data of 
more moderate depth and range. 
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5.4.2 Inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning 
While qualitative research is generally considered to be inductive, content 
analysis can also be deductive (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) 
and abductive (Patton, 2002, p. 470; Råholm, 2010). In induction, categories and 
themes are derived from the data. In deduction, they are instead theoretically 
derived and applied to the data as an analytical grid. In abduction, the two 
approaches are combined (Patton, 2002, p. 470). Abduction, however, does not 
just imply an alternation between the two. By focusing on underlying patterns in 
the data, it opens up for a deeper understanding (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008, p. 
55; Eriksson & Lindström, 1997). In abductive reasoning, the analysis sets out 
inductively. Based on empirical data, the analyst makes hypotheses about 
possible general patterns which would explain the observations. The hypotheses 
are then tested against all data/additional cases to see if they can be verified 
(Peirce, 1955, pp. 150–156). 
My endeavour has been to select the approach in analysis that best 
represents the data and serves the purpose of each substudy (Patton, 2002, p. 
433). In all substudies (I–IV) the transcribed data was initially read through 
several times to get a sense of the whole and determine how to proceed in the 
analysis. In substudy I a deductive approach was selected to describe how Selves 
1–3 were expressed in the semistructured interviews with the 12 participants 
before they started to attend the support groups. Expressions of Selves 1–3 were 
first marked in the margins. Since Self 1 was clearly expressed by participants 
using personal indexicals, no further attention was given to this Self. Expressions 
of Selves 2 and 3 were then sorted, resulting in two preliminary categories. On 
further examination of their contents, the Self 2 category was split into one 
category of expressed life histories and one of expressed personal attributes, also 
derived from Harré’s (1998) theory of self. Finally, subcategories were 
constructed, which also relied heavily on the same theory. 
In substudy II support group conversations were abductively analysed to 
describe how Self 2 was expressed by participants in the support group. After the 
initial reading, expressions of Self 2 were extracted from the text as meaning 
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units and condensed. Because they appeared to concern participants’ agency and 
their relations to other people, the concepts of agency and communion (Bakan, 
1966) were proposed as a framework for further analysis. The categories were 
derived from McAdams’s coding scheme for agency and communion 
(McAdams, 1988; McAdams et al., 1996), described earlier in this text. The 
condensed expressions of Self 2 were interpreted and sorted into the categories. 
The categories covered all meaning units. 
In substudy III the data from substudy II were re-examined (secondary 
analysis is further described below) to describe how participants positioned 
themselves in the support group. An inductive, interpretive approach was 
chosen, with analytic steps resembling those described by Downe-Wamboldt 
(1992). Sequences typical for how participants positioned themselves and each 
other were extracted from the text. Notes about the possible meanings of the 
positionings were then made in the margins. On scrutinizing the notes, it 
appeared that a few first-order positions gave rise to much of the interaction 
occurring between the participants. A preliminary category system was 
constructed from those positions. The preliminary category system was tested 
and adjusted to cover all the extracted sequences of text. Each category of the 
adjusted system was again scrutinized to see how participants interacted to co-
construct positions. 
In substudy IV interviews and support group conversations (some of 
which were previously analysed in substudies I–III) were analysed to describe 
how participants expressed their experience of being research participants. An 
inductive, interpretive approach was used, applying Graneheim and Lundman’s 
(2004) definitions of content areas as parts of the data concerning specific topics, 
categories as distinctly separable parts of descriptive data with shared 
commonalities, and themes as threads of meaning appearing across categories. 
The parts of the texts where participants spoke of being research participants 
were extracted and examined. They concerned participation in the support 
groups, in the present research as a whole, and in other research (predominantly 
medical). These areas were thus considered the content areas. The extracted text 
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was sorted into the content areas, and was then divided into meaning units, 
which were condensed and coded. Similar codes within each content area were 
then sorted into categories and subcategories. Because there were apparent 
similarities between the content areas, an overview of all subcategories and 
categories was constructed. In this comparison, three cross-running themes were 
constructed. 
5.4.3 Secondary analysis 
In substudy III, and partly in substudy IV, secondary analyses of data which had 
been previously analysed in substudies I and II were conducted. Secondary 
analysis in qualitative research can be useful for answering questions that were 
not raised in the primary analysis (Hinds, Vogel, & Clarke-Steffen, 1997; 
Thorne, 1998). The use of existing data sets saves time and effort for both the 
researchers and the participants, but there are ethical and methodological issues. 
When the same researchers conduct both the primary and secondary analysis, as 
in this project, they have the advantage of knowing the quality of the data and 
the context from which it is collected, which decreases the number of possible 
pitfalls described in the literature (Hinds et al., 1997; Thorne, 1998). There was 
also no need to collect renewed informed consent from participants, because the 
new research questions were covered in the consent to the overall project (cf. 
Thorne, 1998). Even so, some issues are applicable to the present research. 
When secondary analysis is performed, fewer people are heard in the research 
(Thorne, 1998). This is an ethical concern, and also a methodological one, 
because including more people might bring additional perspectives on the 
research questions (Thorne, 1998). When small data sets are analysed repeatedly, 
there is also a risk of ‘exaggerating the influence of convincing peculiarities 
within that data set if its features are uncritically accepted’ (Thorne, 1998, p. 
549). Any research bias affecting the primary study, that is, the impact the 
researchers might have had on the participants and data, will be transmitted to 
the secondary study (Thorne, 1998). The researcher must further determine 
whether the sampling and data collection of the primary study have been 
performed in a manner that is appropriate to answer the new research questions 
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(Hinds et al., 1997; Thorne, 1998). It must be clearly stated in publications of 
secondary analyses that there are previous studies on the same data. This enables 
readers to compare studies and, for example, detect any bias that might be 
repeated over publications (Hinds et al., 1997; Thorne, 1998). The sampling and 
data collection procedures must also be as clearly described in the secondary 
publications as in the primary, to allow readers to assess their appropriateness 
(Thorne, 1998). 
5.4.4 Trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of naturalistic research is a matter of credibility, 
dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 
289–331). The terms are equivalent to the terms internal validity, reliability, 
external validity, and objectivity in the realist research paradigm. Morse, Barrett, 
Mayan, Olson, and Spiers (2002) have argued that the realist terms are also 
relevant in naturalistic research and should be favoured. To enhance credibility, 
all data analyses (I–IV) were repeatedly discussed within the research team and 
alternative approaches considered, until agreement about meaning units, 
condensation, interpretation, categories, and themes was achieved. ‘Negative 
cases’, that is, data which are contradictory to or do not fit into the preliminary 
categories, were actively sought during the analyses (I–IV). In papers I–IV the 
quotes that appeared to best represent the data were presented to allow readers to 
assess the credibility of the findings. To ensure dependability, the research 
process was constantly monitored and discussed in the research team and in 
seminars with external researchers. To allow readers to assess the transferability 
of the present findings to other contexts, I have sought to describe the 
procedures, participants, and context of the present research thoroughly. 
Throughout the research process I have also made notes and saved 
documentation about the progress of work to create an audit trail and thus 
enhance the confirmability of the research. 
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5.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The participants and their family members received oral and written information 
about the research project at the Alzheimer’s café. Those who were interested in 
participating reported this to the managers of the café, who were also managing 
the support groups. Information about the practical arrangements was posted to 
those who signed up, together with renewed information about the research 
study. I then contacted each family on the telephone and made appointments for 
the interviews. When the person with AD lived alone, a family member was first 
phoned and assisted in making the arrangements. Before the interviews started, 
information was once again given orally. Participants were ensured of 
confidentiality and anonymous presentation of the findings. They were informed 
that participation was voluntary and that they were entitled to withdraw at any 
time prior to the start of the data analysis without stating a reason. Written 
consent was obtained. This was done in the presence of the family member, 
except for two participants. All participants were, however, considered capable 
of understanding the information and consenting autonomously. During the data 
collection the information was repeated when needed, and we made sure of the 
participants’ continued consent. 
Since unfamiliar contexts and social situations are known to be 
potentially stressful to people with AD, measures were taken to create a safe, 
calm, and friendly milieu around the support groups. The sessions were held at a 
daycare centre for people with DD after its regular closing hour. The setting was 
homey and allowed for groups to meet in adjacent rooms. The participants with 
AD and their family members could thus arrive and depart together, while 
attending separate groups. There was also a kitchen in which all could have 
coffee together and chat informally at the end of each session, before leaving. In 
case a participant with AD should need to leave the support group during a 
session, (for example, to find a toilet) there were volunteers available outside the 
door to assist them. The research received ethical approval from the Regional 
Ethics Committee (2008/913-31/4). 
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6 FINDINGS 
The overall aim was to describe in terms of Harré’s theories of self (Harré, 1998) 
and positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990) how self was expressed by people with 
AD in interviews and support group conversations. All participants were able to 
express their sense of self, although a few had substantial language impairments 
(I), which decreased their ability to describe their experiences in detail. 
Participants used various means to express their sense of self when their memory 
failed them. For example, they asked family members to fill in details of their 
accounts, gestured, and showed items to clarify what they were referring to (I). 
Participants expressed a basic sense of self appearing to be intact, in spite of 
changing attributes and life histories (I). A sense of agency and communion 
(autonomy and togetherness) was interpreted to be essential to their sense of self 
(II). Taking part in the support group (III) and research (IV) appeared to 
strengthen participants’ sense of self by providing them an opportunity to create 
positive social personae with the co-operation off researchers, facilitators, and 
each other. In the following, I will summarize the findings from the substudies 
(I–IV) concerning Selves 1–3.  
6.1 A PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW – EXPRESSIONS OF SELF 1 
Self 1, the point of view as a singular, embodied person, which is expressed by 
the use of first person pronouns (Harré, 1998), seemed to be unaffected in the 
participants (I). Even those who had severe word-finding difficulties used 
personal pronouns adequately and without apparent effort. Self 1 was thus not 
further explored. 
6.2 LIFE HISTORIES AND ATTRIBUTES – EXPRESSIONS OF SELF 
2 
Participants’ expressions of Self 2, the personal attributes and beliefs about those 
attributes, and life history, were analysed in substudies I, II, and IV.  
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6.2.1 The past, present, and possible future life histories 
In the interviews (I) before attending the support groups, participants’ 
expressions of Self 2 formed three subcategories concerning life before having 
AD, the experience of living with AD, and the future: I had a vivid life, then you 
had received your sentence, and as long as it doesn’t get worse. I had a vivid life 
concerned participants’ accounts of their childhood, family, and professional 
lives. Their moral values and personal achievements were commonly in focus. 
The accounts also concerned people and events that had made a special impact 
on participants and formed their views of life and themselves. The subcategory 
Then you had received your sentence concerned participants’ accounts of how 
they had come to realize that they had AD. This was commonly described as a 
traumatic event causing strong reactions, for example, nightmares about 
becoming severely disabled, thoughts about deliberately ending one’s life, and 
feelings of grief and worthlessness. Participants also described less severe 
reactions to being diagnosed, for example, finding it ‘inconvenient’. Sometimes, 
the diagnosis was less unexpected, as when several closer relatives had 
previously had AD. Occasionally, participants expressed overcoming their first 
negative reactions quite easily, by deliberately downplaying and ignoring the 
diagnosis. The immediate consequences of the diagnosis, such as having to quit 
driving or working, were sometimes described as the most difficult. 
The subcategory As long as it doesn’t get worse consisted of 
participants’ accounts about their possible future selves. Participants said that 
they had learned to avoid thinking ahead, and chose to focus on the present. The 
future, they said, was unpredictable, but likely to implicate progressing illness 
and nursing home placement. This was something they said they could not 
change. They could, however, enjoy life as long as they did not get worse. 
Participants said that they worried more about burdening and causing sorrow on 
their families than about their own future, being certain that they themselves 
would be taken care of. They also said they had hope, although they knew that 
the chances were small, that more efficient drugs would be developed, which 
would improve their situation or even cure them. 
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6.2.2 Feeling the same in spite of altered attributes  
When describing their Self 2 attributes in the interviews before their support 
group participation (I), participants said that they were the same people as before 
having AD, although they had changed in some ways. Two subcategories 
concerning attributes were formed: I have become more humble, and actually, 
you learn to live like that. I have become more humble (I) concerned 
participants’ expressed Self 2 attributes in terms of character traits and moral 
values. Participants said they were less spirited and found it more difficult to 
engage than before they had AD. However, they also described positive changes. 
They said they had learned to let go of prestige, lower their demands on 
themselves, take better care of their own well-being, and become more open. 
Concerning values, participants said that they now appreciated their families 
more than before they had AD. The things they valued most in life had otherwise 
not changed. Family, health, well-functioning everyday life, travelling, music, 
and friends were among the things mentioned as most highly valued. Being kind 
and decent to other people was also described important.  
The subcategory actually, you learn to live like that (I) concerned 
participants’ accounts of altered personal skills due to AD. Several previous 
skills had been lost or deteriorated, and some skills had also been achieved or 
developed in dealing with the condition. Occasionally, participants said that they 
were still able to do what they had always done. However, participants 
commonly described, for example, their memory skills, and their ability to do 
things simultaneously, find their way, construct and build things, run the 
household, read, count, perform hobbies, drive, follow the news, and converse, 
had deteriorated. Participants said they had learned to manage by using, for 
example, calendars, notes, help from others, careful selection and planning of 
activities, and positive thinking. They described being supported by their 
families and health care professionals. To postpone further deterioration, they 
said it was important to keep physically, mentally, and socially active. 
Participants also said that they found it hard to manage. They expressed sadness 
and despair over not being able to do the things they had previously enjoyed, and 
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a sense of disappointment with not receiving sufficient support from family and 
health care professionals in their efforts to manage. 
6.2.3 Self 2 expressed as agency and communion 
In support group conversations (II), the participants’ expressions of Self 2 were 
interpreted in terms of agency and communion, the urge to be autonomous and 
the urge to connect to other people. The categories were adopted from 
McAdams’s coding scheme (McAdams, 1988; McAdams et al., 1996). A sense 
of agency was expressed in accounts of self-mastery, status/victory, 
achievement/responsibility, and power/impact. Agency appeared in accounts of 
the past as thoroughly established, in the present as something that had to be 
constantly strived for, and in the future as something hoped for. Self-mastery 
mainly concerned participants’ struggles to manage everyday life, when living 
with AD. They described strategies by which they were still able to do things 
that they always had done, and also how they avoided some tasks, rather than 
wasting energy on things that they knew were impossible to perform. Preserving 
self-mastery in daily decisions concerning themselves was important, they said. 
To enhance self-mastery, participants described, for example, using aids, 
increasing their efforts, accepting help from others, and gaining knowledge about 
AD. While self-mastery concerned the present and future, the accounts referring 
to the agency categories status/victory, achievement/responsibility, and 
power/impact were predominantly set in the past. Status/victory typically 
contained accounts of triumphant experiences in participants’ professional 
careers. These were situations in which they had done exceptionally well in spite 
of poor preconditions, or had overcome resistance from others. One participant 
described how she had prepared and given a lecture to an international audience, 
which had been very successful, despite her lack of experience in the area. 
Achievement/responsibility concerned more long-term efforts and achievements 
predominantly at work, but also privately and in the present. The achievements 
were often connected with moral values of what was good and worth struggling 
for in life. Participants spoke with pride about their contributions to society and 
their families. In the present they said they were still able to make some 
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contributions, for example, by participating in research on AD. Participants also 
emphasized taking responsibility for their own health. Power/impact concerned 
accounts of how participants had been inspired and empowered by other people, 
including parents, employers, and teachers, and also by their religious faith. 
A sense of lacking agency was expressed in accounts of 
failure/weakness, losing face, ignorance, and conflict. Lack of agency was most 
apparent in accounts of the present and future. Failure/weakness concerned 
participants’ accounts of how they were now unable to perform things that they 
had previously done. The difficulties mentioned were similar to those described 
in the interviews (I). Participants expressed a sense of loss, sadness, and 
powerlessness, in that their efforts to maintain their skills were often in vain. 
They frequently used humour when accounting for their shortcomings. The 
difficulties with performing various activities made them feel inactive and 
marginalized, they said. They also expressed being frustrated by having to ask 
for help. Participants expressed fear of increasing impairment in the future. 
Losing face concerned situations in which participants’ difficulties had become 
obvious to others. For example, they described suddenly not being able to count 
money when shopping, or becoming disoriented in their own neighbourhoods. 
Although participants predominantly agreed that AD was nothing to be ashamed 
of, those were described as embarrassing incidents. Participants also described 
not being able to maintain their appearance, and struggling to camouflage their 
memory problems to others. Ignorance concerned participants’ reported episodes 
of confusion, the uncertainty of what the future would bring, and the lack of 
scientific knowledge about their condition and what could be done to improve it. 
Conflict appeared in participants’ accounts of their driving skills. While some 
participants said that they had made the decision themselves to quit driving, 
others said they were still able to drive, and had had their driving licence 
withdrawn without their agreement. 
A sense of communion was expressed in accounts of love/friendship, 
dialogue, caring/help, and unity/togetherness. Communion was predominantly 
set in the past and present. Participants’ accounts of love and friendship were 
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ambiguous. They described feeling close to friends and family, and at the same 
time drifting apart. Their spouses, they said, continued to lead busy lives, 
whereas participants had to slow down. Participants described not having the 
energy to stay in touch with all their friends, and said that the close family now 
had become more important to them. Dialogue concerned the conversation in the 
support group. In the support group participants said that they could talk freely 
about their difficulties, and were heard and understood, because they all shared 
similar problems. Caring/help contained participants’ accounts of how they had 
cared for and helped other people and still tried to be helpful. It also concerned 
helping each other in the support group, so that, for example, all participants had 
opportunities to speak. Unity/togetherness concerned the participants’ expressed 
sense of connectedness with other people, especially with family, and also with 
each other in the support group and all people with AD. It further concerned an 
expressed sense of unity with their roots and with humankind. 
A sense of lacking communion was expressed in accounts of separation, 
rejection, disillusionment about people, and another’s misfortune. Participants 
said they felt separated from others, not being able to work and keep up with a 
busy schedule any more. Sometimes, they said, they avoided people because of 
embarrassment over their speech impairments. Participants also expressed 
feeling rejected. This concerned other people avoiding them, making light of 
their condition, and being impatient with them. Participants said that AD had low 
status, and was not prioritized in health care and research. Further they spoke 
about feeling labelled. Disillusionment about people concerned accounts of 
unsupportive and insensitive people in the present, and also of events occurring 
in the past when they described being disappointed with people who had let them 
down and not showed them the appreciation that they deserved. Another’s 
misfortune, finally, concerned accounts of being sad about family members 
being burdened with the consequences of their condition. 
6.2.4 Being a research participant 
One of the Self 2 attributes expressed by participants was that of being a 
participant in research (IV). In the interviews at the beginning and end of the 
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support group intervention, and in the support group conversations, participants 
shared their experiences of participating in the present and other (predominantly 
medical) research. Their accounts formed three themes, which were present 
regardless of types of research: contributing to an important cause, gaining from 
participating in research, and experiencing risks and drawbacks of participating 
in research. Participants said that they felt that they could contribute to 
something important by volunteering for research projects on AD. They said that 
research on AD was not highly enough prioritized by society, in comparison 
with, for example cancer research, which they said received more attention and 
higher status. It was paramount that the research on AD progress for the sake of 
future generations, and if necessary, they were willing to take some personal 
risks by participating in research, they said. In the present research, the support 
group intervention, participants said they were happy to contribute. They also 
showed a personal interest in the researcher, knowing that she was a doctoral 
student, by frequently asking her how she was doing and how her work was 
progressing. 
Participants also said they gained personally from participating in 
research. When participating in drug trials, they said, they hoped to receive the 
active substance of new drugs and not the placebo, and that the substance would 
have a positive effect on their condition. By taking part, they said, they got 
access to drugs not otherwise available. Participating also gave them access to 
more information about AD than they received in their regular care. Further, they 
said that participating gave them something to do, and an opportunity to meet 
other people with AD and learn from each other. 
Participants expressed that there were also risks and drawbacks 
associated with research participation. While some said it was worth the risks, 
one participant told of having declined participation in a drug trial because of the 
risks. Drawbacks were also mentioned, for example, that it was time consuming 
and tiresome to pay extra visits to the clinic, and that tests could be painful, 
uncomfortable, or embarrassing to go through. However, participants also 
expressed pride when speaking about the downsides of research which they 
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endured. In the present project, participants sometimes expressed doubts about 
its value and procedures. Some said they found it difficult to see how ‘just 
talking’ in the support groups could contribute to the research on AD. It also 
occurred that participants said that they wished to contribute, but doubted their 
ability, because of their word-finding difficulties. Occasionally, participants 
declined or avoided answering an interview question or questionnaire item. It 
was interpreted that this could be due to questions being perceived as threatening 
their integrity. They did not withdraw from participation, but chose to continue 
on their own terms by making objections, or simply changing the topic, thus 
seemingly managing to guard their integrity. Another obstacle to participation in 
the present project was mentioned by a participant who said that he had first 
been reluctant to enrol, because participation would define him as an ‘Alzheimer 
person’. After having met the other participants he had realized that all were 
‘ordinary people’, and he had even been comforted to see that some of the others 
had more severe symptoms than he himself. 
6.3 SOCIAL PERSONAE – EXPRESSIONS OF SELF 3 
Self 3, the social personae constructed when people display their Selves 1 and 2 
to other people and receive their response, was analysed in substudies I, III, and 
IV. In substudies I and IV, participants’ accounts of their interactions with other 
people were analysed, and in substudy III the interaction between participants in 
a support group was analysed. 
6.3.1 Self 3 in jeopardy 
In the interviews before the start of the support groups (I), participants expressed 
uncertainty in their relationships with other people. They said it had become 
more difficult to socialize because of their decreasing ability to follow 
conversation, and reliance on help with transportation. Participants said that they 
were open about having AD, and were not treated differently because of the 
condition. They stated that it was important to be themselves, and not conceal 
their difficulties. They also said it was important to act normal, and to be as usual 
in order to be treated as usual. Participants said that some people avoided them 
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now that they had AD, and that people failed to address them in conversations. 
They also described other people diminishing and trivializing their condition. 
They also did not appreciate when too much concern was given to their 
condition, as this made them feel their abilities were questioned. Although 
family members were commonly described by the participants as supportive, 
they could also make impatient remarks and otherwise make them feel inferior, 
they said. Participants expressed understanding about poor treatment from 
others. They said that it might be due to fear and lack of knowledge about AD 
and that they might have reacted in the same way themselves, before they 
learned about the condition. 
6.3.2 Co-construction of self in support group interaction 
In the support group conversations (III) participants positioned themselves in 
line with their life histories, and were predominantly affirmed in their positions 
by each other. They also positioned and repositioned each other in the 
interaction. Five first-order positions that gave rise to interaction were those of 
the project manager, the storyteller, the moral agent, the person burdened with 
AD, and the coping person. All positions were taken by all participants, although 
in a more pronounced way by some. The position of project manager was taken 
by participants telling about how they had managed important tasks at work and 
privately, before they had AD. It was also taken in the form of initiatives to 
impact the purpose and procedures of the support group. The storyteller position 
was taken by participants telling the group the histories of their lives. Those 
could be short or long and concern their childhood, adult life, and experiences 
with AD. The moral agent position was taken by participants making moral 
statements. These could concern human responsibilities towards family, other 
people, and society; being economically responsible; and being considerate to 
each other in the support group. The position of the person burdened with AD 
was taken by participants telling each other how the impairment and stigma 
associated with AD had impacted their lives and how it might impact their 
future. The coping person position was taken by participants relating how they 
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managed to cope with their difficulties. Participants also helped each other to 
cope in the group. 
Participants displayed a range of affirmative responses to the first-order 
positions. They listened attentively, made encouraging and appreciative remarks, 
asked interested questions, agreed with each other, and laughed at each other’s 
jokes. They were also anxious that all participants should have the chance to 
make their voices heard, giving each other time to find words, and helping each 
other with comprehension and word finding. They were not always affirmative, 
though. Repositioning of the first-order positions into modified positions was 
interpreted to occur when other participants perceived the person in the first-
order position as becoming pretentious. When, for example, the project manager 
was perceived to boast, the storyteller to occupy too much talking space, and the 
moral agent to be self-righteous, they were repositioned by other participants 
into less ‘grandiose’ positions. This could be done, for example, by initially 
using a bantering tone to serve as a warning. When this had no effect, 
repositioning could be achieved by teasing and subtle scorn and ridicule. 
Participants also brought issues up explicitly on a general level, for example, the 
importance of everyone having equal opportunities to speak in a group. They 
could also question each other’s positions explicitly. This happened, for 
example, when participants found it difficult to believe that other participants 
were burdened with AD, because their reported difficulties were not visible or 
did not fit in with the general picture of AD. Participants were also explicitly 
questioned when they expressed coping too well, as when they denied having 
difficulties such as memory problems. 
In spite of the repositioning that occurred, the first-order positions 
generally received enough affirmation to be manifested on a reasonable level. 
The facilitator had an important role in supporting the first order positionings 
and sorting out misunderstandings. Participants were appreciative of the group 
and of each other. They said that they had come to know and like each other and 
that they felt that they had been able to speak openly and be heard in the group. 
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The overall interpretation was that Self 3 was strengthened by the support group 
interaction. 
6.3.3 Co-construction of self in research participation 
When participating in research (IV), participants described that they received 
affirmation from researchers and others who appreciated their contribution and 
offered them personal and friendly relationships when they visited the research 
units. This was interpreted also as strengthening participants’ sense of self. In 
participants’ accounts of their research participation, they emphasized their 
personal relationships with the researchers. Participants described how they 
came to know the researchers, and how they were always cheerfully greeted 
when they went to appointments. Researchers made time for casual chats, and 
for giving extensive information about the research projects. Participants 
expressed feeling chosen, included, cared for, and valued by the researchers, and 
worthy of efforts to improve their own and their families’ lives. It was 
interpreted that participants received cooperation from the researchers in 
constructing social personae of contributors to an important cause. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
The present research has focused on how people with AD expressed sense of self 
in the contexts of personal interviews and group conversations with other people 
with AD. In both contexts, methods to facilitate communication with people with 
cognitive impairment and to support a positive sense of self were applied during 
the collection of data. Throughout the work, Harré’s theories of self and 
positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré, 1998) have been applied as 
theoretical frameworks, guiding the research. Selecting a theoretical framework 
is about finding the most suitable perspective to fit the research question at hand 
(Richards & Morse, 2007, p. 47). The social constructionist view of self was 
useful not only because it illuminates the difficulties concerning sense of self in 
people with AD, but also because it shows how their sense of self can be 
supported by other people. In this section I will start by reflecting on the findings 
and continue by accounting for my methodological considerations. In the next 
section I will sum up some my conclusions and some possible implications of 
the findings for care and for further research. 
7.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The findings expand, in a number of areas, the previous knowledge on sense of 
self in people with Alzheimer’s disease. Most importantly, they deepen the 
knowledge of how sense of self is socially constructed by people with AD in 
various contexts. Further, by using the concepts of agency and communion to 
illuminate Self 2, the understanding of how Self 2 is affected in people with AD 
is expanded. The experiences of people with AD who participate in research are 
descirbed, and the knowledge on how people with early onset of AD express 
their sense of self is extended. The findings also illuminate the unrestricted 
character of Self 2 (Harré, 1998, p. 92), as especially significant to maintain self-
esteem in people with AD. 
The findings show how the participants with AD managed to position 
themselves favourably in the support group (substudy III) and in the interviews 
(substudy I). Further, they show how participants acquired positive positions as 
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research participants in the present and other research (substudy IV), and 
described losing valued positions in other areas of their lives (substudies I-III). 
Although the interviews were not analysed in terms of positioning, and the 
interaction with the researcher was not specifically addressed in the analysis, it 
appears obvious that the participants constructed their sense of self with the 
assistance of the interviewers (substudy I). Even more pronouncedly than in the 
support group conversations (substudy III), participants positioned themselves in 
the initial interviews by emphasizing their past and present achievements, moral 
integrity, and coping abilities (substudy I). In the interviews, the interviewers’ 
ways of conversing with the interviewees formed a supportive context for them 
in several ways. The interviewers were able to assist the speech acts of 
participants by using methods to facilitate communication with people with 
language impairments. The participants were also prepositioned in the positive 
role of research contributors. It was presupposed that they had something 
important to convey, there was sufficient time for the participants to formulate 
answers, and they had the interviewer’s full attention. Further, the researchers 
had no previous knowledge of them and were not influenced by any pre-existing 
negative storylines concerning them personally. The interviewers also had no 
reason to question the positions taken by participants, because we were 
interested in their subjective experiences. In many other situations, the positions 
of people with AD are questioned (Sabat, 2005). Sometimes this might be 
necessary, for example, when people with AD position themselves as capable 
drivers, and other people find them incapable. However, previous research 
shows that people with AD are at risk for being unfairly questioned, because of 
the personal or general negative storylines concerning people with AD (Sabat, 
2005). The negative storylines cause difficulties for them in positioning 
themselves more favourably. Similar to the present findings, other studies (e.g. 
MacRae, 2010; Steeman et al., 2007) based on personal interviews have shown 
that participants with DD positioned themselves positively by emphasizing their 
coping abilities. Steeman and colleagues (2007) found that by doing this, the 
particpants attempted to counterbalance a sense of devaluation. 
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As with the interviews, the support groups formed an advantageous 
context, in which participants supported each other and were supported by the 
facilitator (substudy III). Predominantly, participants affirmed each other’s first-
order positionings. It was, however, apparent that participants had adopted the 
same storylines (i.e. stereotypes) about AD as the rest of society. This has also 
been described previously (Scholl & Sabat, 2008). For example, the present 
participants knew that memory problems were part of the condition, but some 
had difficulties with acknowledging other problems as symptoms of the disease 
(substudy III). Such stereotypes made it difficult for participants to position 
themselves in the burdened person position. The position of burdened might 
seem to be a negative one, however, it appeared to be important to participants to 
have their difficulties recognised by others. Similarly, Eriksen (2013) found that 
people living with chronic mental disorders were relieved when others 
acknowledged their struggles. In previous studies of support group conversations 
involving people with DD, participants also positioned themselves both as 
burdened and as coping (Offord, Hardy, Lamers, & Bergin, 2006; Yale, 1995; 
Örulv, 2012).  
The facilitator of the support group served an important function in 
refuting stereotypes and supporting favourable postitionings of participants 
(substudy III). In the context of the group, it was also more difficult for the quiet 
participants to perform speech acts than it was in the interviews. Although 
participants were considerate and strived to listen to each other, the facilitator 
was important in inviting the quiet to participate in the conversation (substudy 
III). Further, the repositioning was at times somewhat harsh, for example, it 
occasionally occurred that participants scorned each other, although in a playful 
way. There might be a risk that a less supportive group climate would have 
developed without the mediating role of the facilitator (substudy III). A previous 
study has shown that the presence of a professional facilitator hampered the 
communication between participants (Mason, Clare, & Pistrang, 2005). In the 
present research there were no signs of this occurring. 
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When the themes of agency and communion were applied to the data, a 
multifaceted view of Self 2 emerged (substudy II). The crucial role of agency 
and communion to the sense of self was underlined by the fact that all 
expressions of Self 2 could be fitted into the agency and communion categories. 
Previous studies have similarly found that autonomy and connectedness with 
other people are significant to the well-being and sense of self of people with AD 
(e.g. Menne, Kinney, & Morhardt, 2002; Phinney, Chaudhury, & O’Connor, 
2007; Steeman et al., 2013); however, to my knowledge, this has previously not 
been coherently conceptualized in terms of agency and communion. In the 
present findings, the sense of positive agency was mainly associated with 
participants’ lives before the debut of AD, and also with how they managed their 
present difficulties. The lack of agency was strongly related to difficulties due to 
symptoms. The positive communion concerned the past and the present, and the 
lack of communion mainly the present. Some of the positive communion was 
associated with participating in the support group. A sense of unity and 
togetherness with the other participants and with all people with AD was created. 
The dialogue and sharing of similar difficulties implied a sense of communion. 
The support group was also an arena for being helpful and caring towards others. 
In the future, both agency and communion were uncertain. It thus appeared that 
they had decreased over time, and might further diminish in the future. Given the 
close connection between agency, communion, and sense of self that was found, 
this might imply also a decrease or deterioration of sense of self.  
The findings show that participants were able to able to construct 
positive personae when participating in research (substudy IV). They were 
gaining personally, happy to make a contribution for the good of others, though 
also experiencing risks and drawbacks. Recently researchers have described 
research methods that involve people with DD as active partners in research 
(Bartlett, Hick, Houston, Gardiner, & Wallace, 2013; Cowdell, 2006; Pipon-
Young, Lee, Jones, & Guss, 2012). There are, however, few previous studies on 
how research participants with DD perceive research participation. Similar to the 
present findings, Sabat (2003) found that participation might fulfil both personal 
and altruistic needs. Researchers, predominantly medical, have described 
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difficulties in recruiting research participants with AD to studies (Cohen-
Mansfield, 2002; Vellas et al., 2012). Thus, it was somewhat surprising that the 
present participants seemed equally positive to participating in our research and 
medical research. Being people who had already consented to participate in 
research, it might be that they were more positive than average to research 
participation.  
The findings clearly demonstrate the importance of earlier positions and 
achievements in preserving a positive sense of self for the participants. In both 
the interviews (substudy I) and the support group conversations (substudies II 
and III) participants stressed their previous attributes and life histories. 
According to Harré (1998, p. 92), Self 2 might be seen as restricted, containing 
only the present attributes of the person, or unrestricted, including also the past 
and possible future attributes. The importance of the past selves to people with 
AD has also been observed also by other researchers (Sabat, Fath, Moghaddam, 
& Harré, 1999); however, it needs to be further emphasized. 
There is a shortage of research concerning how people with early onset of 
AD experience their difficulties and their sense of self. In the present research 
we were not aiming specifically at focusing on people with early-onset, however, 
it turned out that a majority of the participants belonged to this category. 
Previous research described that people with early onset of AD reported more 
financial difficulties that people with late onset of AD (Batsch & Miller, 2009). 
The present participants did not mention this as a problem. This might be due to 
coincidence, to a relatively stable socioeconomical background of the present 
participants, and to the social security system in Sweden.   
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Because I was interested in the participants’ sense of self, as expressed and 
constructed in discourse, a qualitative approach in conducting the studies was the 
most appropriate choice. Other studies have assessed self and related concepts by 
the use of scales (e.g. Caddell & Clare, 2013a). Such methods might be useful to 
determine the degree of persistence of self, and to compare sense of self between 
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different groups and over time. However, to gain more in-depth knowledge 
about how people co-construct and express sense of self, it was necessary to 
collect data in which the participants were encouraged to speak freely in 
dialogues with other people and to analyse those data qualitatively. 
The participants of the present research consisted of a convenience 
sample, which is generally seen as a limitation (Patton, 2002, p. 241). On the 
other hand, they could also be described as information-rich, which is pursued in 
qualitative research (Patton, 2002, p. 242). Socioeconomically, the participants 
appeared relatively well situated. A majority had education on a university level 
and were cohabiting with spouses. All appeared to be well supported by their 
families. At the interviews conducted in the participants’ homes, it was also 
evident that most participants were living in socioeconomically strong areas. All 
participants except one, who had migrated from another Nordic country, were of 
Swedish origin. Most participants were very verbal and apparently comfortable 
with expressing their opinions and thoughts in both the interviews and the 
support groups. This ability might vary, depending on, for example, educational 
background. Most participants knew each other from the Alzheimer’s café 
before they started in the support groups. They might, thus, have formed 
common views on some issues, resulting in less variation in the data. On the 
other hand, this might have facilitated the interaction in the support groups, and 
contributed to the warm and open climate being quickly established. It is likely 
that living conditions and cultural backgrounds affect how people cope with AD. 
Thus, participants with other backgrounds and living conditions might have 
described their experiences with AD differently. 
The data was collected over a period of approximately nine months, 
which strengthens the credibility of the findings. Prolonged engagement with 
research participants has been recommended to build trust and enhance the 
richness and quality of data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 303). It was apparent that 
the participants became more comfortable and open over time. Some 
participants, in the initial interviews and support group sessions, reported that 
they had only limited and manageable difficulties with AD. When the 
 60 
participants of the support group got to know each other better, however, the 
same participants emphasized their difficulties more and expressed stronger 
negative emotions about their situation. 
In the data collection, the use of indirect repair (Gentry & Fisher, 2007) 
by which the researchers and group facilitators supported participants in finding 
words and expressing their thoughts, implied an obvious risk that the data could 
be influenced by the presumptions of the researchers or facilitators. To avoid 
this, we tried to be alert to both the verbal and non-verbal responses from 
participants, when indirect repair was used. The participants appeared to clearly 
state when the repair was not in line with what they had intended to 
communicate. If they were hesitant in responding to indirect repair, we gave 
alternative suggestions until the participants seemed confident that we had 
understood them correctly. According to the constructionist view of reality, 
meaning is always co-constructed. It is thus inevitable that interlocutors, such as 
an interviewer and an interviewee, influence each other’s perception of meaning. 
During the data collection, the researchers and facilitators nevertheless strived to 
hold back their own opinions and thoughts to minimize their influence on the 
participants. 
Qualitative content analysis has often been described as merely a 
technique for sorting the data, and criticized for lacking theoretical 
underpinnings (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). Without theoretical foundations, 
the analysis remains on a descriptive level, while the theory enables for the 
researcher to make abstractions from the data to a conceptual level (Richards & 
Morse, 2007, pp. 66–67, 157). Qualitative content analysis can, however, easily 
be combined with various theoretical frameworks (Graneheim & Lundman, 
2004). For the purpose of the present research, the combination of qualitative 
content analysis, providing the techniques, and Harré’s theories of self and 
positioning, providing an epistemological basis, was useful. The theories 
facilitated my own understanding of what to look for in the data in the analysis, 
and provided categories for sorting, and means for interpreting, the data. They 
were also useful pedagogic tools when instructing the support group facilitators 
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about how to identify and support the participants’ expressions of sense of self. 
As described in the data analysis section, there were difficulties in separating 
Selves 2 and 3 in the analysis. The solution, namely, to treat the participants’ 
accounts of their interactions with other people as Self 3 in substudy I, and as 
Self 2 in substudy II, was chosen in spite of its inconsistency. Keeping strictly to 
Harré’s definitions, Self 2 would be impossible to explore empirically, since the 
display to other people (in this case the interviewers and fellow support group 
participants) of Self 2 is defined as Self 3 in Harré’s theory.  
At the outset of the research, the ethical issues were frequently discussed 
in the research team. We were prepared for the possibility that some of the 
participants might not be able to provide informed consent autonomously and 
that participants might be upset by talking about their condition and hearing 
about other participants’ troubles in the support group. This, however, did not 
occur. Other and more subtle ethical issues appeared instead during the course of 
the research. For example, one of the participants had very impaired speech and 
severe difficulties with making himself understood, especially in the support 
group, despite the support he received from the group and the facilitator. This 
was obviously grieving him, although he also appeared to enjoy the group 
occasionally. I got the impression that he mainly agreed to participate for the 
sake of his spouse, who strongly needed the support of her support group and 
was reluctant to leave her husband alone at home. The ethical issue was thus not 
a question of whether he was able to consent or not, but rather if it was right to 
allow him to expose himself to a stressful situation with limited benefits for 
himself. On the other hand, this thesis and other studies (e.g. Law, Russ, & 
Connelly, 2013) show that altruism is a significant motive for research 
participation. It could also be argued the participant was likely to have secondary 
benefits from his spouse receiving support. 
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8 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The thesis shows how people with mild and moderate Alzheimer’s disease were 
able to construct a positive sense of self by the support of each other, support 
group facilitators, and researchers. It also showed how participants’ sense of self 
was being constantly jeopardized by the impairments and by the treatment of 
other people. Crucial to their sense of self was a sense of agency and 
communion. The sense of self was expressed in an unrestricted form, with the 
previous attributes and life histories playing a central role in the positive sense of 
self. Although AD has become more known and less shameful in recent years, it 
is still connected with negative stereotypes and stigma, and the participants of 
the present research expressed feeling separated and rejected by other people and 
by the society. Research on AD has generally focused on the increasing 
impairments, care-giver burden, and high costs associated with the condition. 
There is also, however, a growing body of knowledge on what it is like to live 
with AD from the insiders’ perspective, how people with AD manage, and how 
they can be supported by others. There is a need to further increase this 
knowledge, and to make it available to health care providers and planners, family 
members, people with AD themselves, and to the public. With increased 
knowledge, the stigma will eventually be alleviated.  
There is a need to develop the support directed to people with AD, 
especially in the early stages. While support groups for people with AD appear 
to be more common in other parts of the world, they are still rare in Sweden. 
There is a lack of scientific evidence concerning the effects of support groups 
and other forms of psychosocial support directed to people with DD (National 
Alzheimer’s Association, 2007; SBU, 2008), although studies describe positive 
outcomes. Thus, there is a need to improve the knowledge on how to best 
support people with AD. In the National Swedish guidelines for dementia care 
(National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010), psychosocial support directed to 
people with DD in the early stage is not included. In British guidelines (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2007) support groups for people with 
dementia disease are positively mentioned, however, the recommendations 
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include support groups for family carers with no mention of the people with DD 
themselves. Based on the positive experiences described in this and other 
research, and the present lack of support available to people in the early stages of 
DD, I agree with other researchers (National Alzheimer’s Association, 2007) that 
all people who are diagnosed with a DD in an early stage should be offered this 
kind of support, and that it should not be restricted to a certain amount of 
sessions, but continue as long as the person can benefit from it. The present 
findings and other show that also people with moderate AD were able to benefit 
from the support groups; however, for people with severe aphasia, other 
interventions, such as activity groups are likely to better suit their needs. Ideally, 
a variety of interventions should be offered to choose among.  
  It is important that health care providers and family members who are 
involved in the care of people with AD have knowledge of how to facilitate 
communication and support the sense of self. Health care educators have a key 
role in providing future health care professionals with this knowledge, so that 
they are able to use this knowledge themselves and pass it on to family members 
who care for the people with AD in their homes. Harré’s theories of self and 
positioning can provide useful models in teaching about the sense of self, how it 
is affected, and can be supported in people with AD. By focusing on the socially 
constructed character of self, the theories promote a more positive view of 
people with AD than the commonly prevailing. Apart from the obvious fact that 
the people with AD will benefit from this, professionals and family carers will 
also find their task more meaningful when they realize that the ‘loss of self’ is 
not an inescapable fact, but that they in fact can do something to prevent it. A 
more positive view of the self in people with AD will also alleviate family 
members from some of the distress which is associated with the view of 
disappearing selves.   
Future studies could aim at describing how the sense of self is constructed 
by people with AD in other contexts, such as together with family members and 
in various care contexts. Those could also be combined with educational 
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interventions to raise the knowledge of how self can be supported in people with 
AD.  
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9 SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING 
Personer med Alzheimers sjukdom och andra typer av demenssjukdom sägs ofta 
förlora sin upplevelse av själv eller personlig identitet. Detta har sin bakgrund i 
tanken att upplevelsen av själv är beroende av att man kan minnas händelser och 
fakta om sitt tidigare liv. Under senare år har forskare alltmer ifrågasatt denna 
syn på självet och visat att även personer med svår demenssjukdom ibland 
uttrycker sin upplevelse av själv. Ett teoretiskt perspektiv som då använts är 
Harrés delvis social-konstruktionistiska teori om själv (Harré, 1998). Själv utgörs 
enligt Harré av tre slags språkliga konstruktioner, Själv 1, 2 och 3, som man 
använder när man talar om personer. Själv 1 är den förkroppligade upplevelsen 
av att vara en egen person, avgränsad från andra och med ett eget perspektiv på 
tillvaron. Denna upplevelse uttrycks till exempel när man säger ”jag” och på 
olika sätt slår vakt om sin integritet. Själv 2 uttrycker hur man ser på sig själv, 
sina attribut och sin livsberättelse. I attributen ingår till exempel ens 
karaktärsdrag, intressen, värderingar och livåskådning. I livsberättelsen ingår till 
exempel händelser, personer och platser som haft betydelse i ens liv. Själv 3 är 
den sociala konstruktionen av själv. Där ingår både hur man positionerar sig, det 
vill säga hur man visar sig för andra personer och hur man uppfattas av dem. 
Egna och andras föreställningar om ens redan existerande position bestämmer 
ramarna för hur man kan och vill positionera sig. Som yrkesperson till exempel, 
önskar man och förväntas oftast positionera sig inom ramarna för yrkesrollen, 
medan man som till exempel förälder har andra förväntningar att förhålla sig till. 
Positioneringen sker till stor del genom genom ”tal-akter”, det vill säga det man 
säger, men också genom andra handlingar, som hur man klär sig och var man 
bosätter sig. I det sociala spelet uppstår gemensamma berättelser om hur man är 
som person. Dessa har också betydelse för hur man positionerar sig och 
uppfattas i kommande möten med samma eller andra personer.  
Harrés teori förklarar på ett bra sätt hur upplevelsen av själv kan påverkas 
hos den som har Alzheimers sjukdom. Genom sjukdomen påverkas negativt 
många av de attribut man själv och andra tidigare har uppskattat. Undan för 
undan förloras förmågor, som till exempel att kunna köra bil, tänka snabbt, räkna 
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och skriva. Genom att demenssjukdom ofta medför talsvårigheter (afasi) minskar 
personens förmåga att positionera sig via tal-akter. När man får en 
demenssjukdom riskerar man också att automatiskt positioneras negativt av 
andra, till exempel som mindre vetande och otillförlitlig, på grund av de negativa 
berättelser som redan finns i samhället om personer med kognitiva 
funktionshinder. Det blir därför svårt att få gehör från andra när man försöker 
positionera sig mera positivt. De misstag man gör förstärker de negativa 
berättelser som redan finns, samtidigt som ens kvarvarande förmågor tenderar att 
negligeras då de inte stämmer med rådande föreställningar. Forskning som 
använt sig av Harrés teori ger exempel som belyser hur detta sker. Samtidigt har 
man visat att personer med Alzheimers sjukdom kan positionera sig mera 
positivt när de får stöd i detta av sina samtalspartners. Det finns ett behov av att 
vidare utveckla kunskapen om hur upplevelsen av själv påverkas i olika 
sammanhang hos personer med Alzheimer’s sjukdom och hur de kan stödjas i att 
bevara en positiv upplevelse av själv.  
Det övergripande syftet med avhandlingen var att med hjälp av Harrés teori 
beskriva hur personer med Alzheimers sjukdom uttryckte sin upplevelse av själv 
i enskilda intervjuer och i gruppsamtal tillsammans med andra personer med 
Alzheimers sjukdom och en samtalsledare med kunskap om hur upplevelse av 
själv kan stödjas. Avhandlingen består av fyra delstudier.  
Information och inbjudan till att delta i studien förmedlades via en 
caféverksamhet för personer med Alzheimers sjukdom och deras närstående. 
Tretton personer med mild och måttlig grad av Alzheimers sjukdom anmälde sig 
och delades in i två samtalsgrupper som träffades tio gånger var under en period 
av åtta månader. Före starten och efter avslutandet av grupperna genomfördes 
semistrukturerade personliga intervjuer med deltagarna om dem själva, deras 
tidigare liv, deras tillvaro med Alzheimers sjukdom och deras syn på sin framtid. 
I de avslutande intervjuerna tillfrågades deltagarna även om hur det upplevt att 
delta i samtalsgruppen. Gruppsamtalen inleddes av samtalsledaren och 
deltagarna inbjöds sedan att ta upp samtalsämnen som de själva fann angelägna 
att samtala om. Under intervjuer och gruppsamtal använde forskarna och 
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samtalsledarna ett förhållningssätt som var avsett att främja deltagarnas 
upplevelse av själv. Intervjuerna och gruppsamtalen ljudinspelades och skrevs ut 
ordagrannt inför analysen.  
I delstudie I analyserades de inledande intervjuerna med 12 deltagare med 
syfte att beskriva hur deltagarna uttryckte sin upplevelse av själv i personliga 
samtal. En kvalitativ deduktiv innehållsanalys genomfördes. Resultatet visade att 
deltagarna uttryckte sin upplevelse av Själv 1 utan svårighet genom användandet 
av personliga pronomina, till exempel “jag”. I upplevelsen av Själv 2 beskrev 
deltagarna att deras attribut ändrats så tillvida att de förlorat förmågor att göra 
vissa saker som de tidigare kunnat, men att de samtidigt lärt sig nya saker genom 
att leva med Alzheimers sjukdom. De beskrev också att några av deras 
egenskaper förändrats på både positiva och negativa sätt. Övergripande upplevde 
sig deltagarna som samma person som innan de fick Alzheimers sjukdom. Själv 
3, det socialt konstruerade självet, beskrevs som oftast bekräftat men ibland 
äventyrat i mötet med andra människor. För deltagarna var det viktigt att ”vara 
som vanligt” för att inte bli betraktade som ”konstiga” av andra.  
I delstudie II analyserades gruppsamtalen från en av samtalsgrupperna, som 
bestod av fem av personerna med Alzheimers sjukdom. Syftet var att beskriva 
hur deltagarna uttryckte sin upplevelse av Själv 2 tillsammans med andra 
personer med Alzheimers sjukdom och samtalsledaren i gruppen. Analysen 
skedde med hjälp av kvalitativ abduktiv innehållsanalys. Resultatet visade att 
deltagarna uttryckte Själv 2 i termer av autonomi (agency) och gemenskap 
(communion) och en brist på autonomi och gemenskap. Det tycktes som om 
både autonomin och gemenskapen med andra personer tenderade att avta över 
tid.   
I delstudie III analyserades samma gruppsamtal som i delstudie II, nu med 
syfte att beskriva hur deltagarna konstruerade Själv 3 tillsammans i gruppen. 
Materialet analyserades med hjälp av kvalitativ induktiv innehållsanalys. 
Resultatat visade att deltagarna ofta positionerade sig som projektledare, 
historieberättare, moraliska agenter, tyngda av sjukdomen och behärskande 
sjukdomen. Deltagarna bekräftade oftast men kunde också modifiera varandras 
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positioneringar. Samspelet i gruppen tolkades som huvudsakligen stärkande för 
deltagarnas upplevelse av Själv 3.  
I intervjer och gruppsamtal beskrev deltagarna hur de upplevde att delta i 
detta och andra forskningsprojekt. Forskningsdeltagandet uttrycktes som en del 
av självet. I delstudie IV bestämdes därför att närmare studera hur deltagarna 
uttryckte sin upplevelse av att vara forskningsdeltagare och att diskutera 
resultatet i termer av Harrés teori om själv. I analysen användes all insamlad 
data, det vill säga de inspelade gruppsamtalen från båda samtalsgrupperna (totalt 
20) samt intervjuerna före och efter deras genomförande (totalt 23). Materialet 
analyserades med hjälp av kvalitativ induktiv innehållsanalys. Oavsett om 
deltagarna talade om att delta i detta projekt eller i andra, huvudsakligen 
medicinska studier, framträdde tre gemensamma teman. Deltagarna beskrev att 
de upplevde att de bidrog till något viktigt, att de hade egna fördelar av att delta 
och att de upplevde risker och nackdelar med att delta. Forskningsdeltagandet 
beskrevs till exempel som en möjlighet att komma forskarna nära, att få göra en 
insats och att få del av information och läkemedel som annars inte var 
tillgängliga på samma sätt. Forskningsdeltagandet tolkades som en möjlighet att 
konstruera en positiv upplevelse av själv.   
Sammantaget visade studierna att deltagarna fick möjlighet att stärka sin 
upplevelse av själv med hjälp av varandra och ledaren i samtalsgruppen och med 
forskarna i detta och andra projekt. Resultatet visade också att upplevelsen av 
själv var skör och riskerade att försämras i framtiden. Upplevelsen av autonomi 
och gemenskap var viktig för självet och behöver stödjas hos personer med 
Alzheimers sjukdom. Deltagarna behövde också hjälp att positionera sig positivt 
i sociala sammanhang. Det är därför viktigt att öka kunskapen om hur 
upplevelsen av själv kan stödjas hos personer med Alzheimers sjukdom hos 
vårdpersonal, familjemedlemmar och hos allmänheten.          
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Appendix 1. Interview guide for interviews conducted before support group 
participation (substudies I & IV).  
Demographic data 
- Year of birth 
- Diagnosis 
- Time since receiving the diagnosis 
- Family and living arrangements 
- Medication 
Please tell me about your previous life 
- How has life been so far? 
- What has been good/difficult in life? 
- What has been important in life? Interests, values, important persons who have 
had an impact/been role models. 
- The things you have valued in life, have they changed over your lifetime? At the 
onset of Alzheimer’s disease? 
- How would you describe yourself as a person? Are you more of an optimist or a 
pessimist? Has this changed during your life? When you 
discovered/experienced symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease? 
- Is there anything in particular that you are proud of in life? Happy, grateful, 
disappointed, angry about? 
- Has life been meaningful so far? 
Please tell me how life is now 
- How has the disease affected life/daily living? 
- How has it affected you as a person? 
- How has it affected your role in the family and society? 
- Has the disease affected your sense of your own value? 
- How has the disease affected contact with friends and leisure activities? 
- How are you being treated by family, friends, health care professionals, and 
people you meet? 
- What kind of support have you received privately and from health care 
professionals? 
- Has your view of what is important in life changed? What is important today? 
Please tell me how you view the future 
- With anxiety or confidence? Optimism/pessimism? 
Future needs and possibilities of receiving help from family members and society 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide for interviews conducted after support group 
participation (substudy IV).  
What has happened since the first interview? 
- How did you find participating in the support group? 
- Important life events since the first interview? 
- Any changes in medication since the first interview? 
Please tell me how life is now 
- How does the disease affect life/daily living? 
- How does it affect you as a person? 
- How does it affect your role in the family and society? 
- How does it affect your sense of your own value? 
- How does it affect your contact with friends and leisure activities? 
- How are you being treated by family, friends, health care professionals, and 
people you meet? 
- What kind of support do you receive privately and from health care 
professionals? 
- Has your view of what is important in life changed? What is important today? 
Please tell me how you view the future 
- With anxiety or confidence? Optimism/pessimism? 
Future needs and possibilities of receiving help from family members and society? 
